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ABSTRACT  
 
Charismatic mega-fauna species such as elephants and rhinos have valuable tusks and 
horns that are sought after by opportunistic poachers.  Poaching also assumes the form 
of subsistence hunting by households living in and around protected areas.  The 
conservation of endangered animal species is important for the environmental 
sustainability of natural ecosystems.  This dissertation consists of four separate essays 
on the economics of poaching and protection of endangered species.   
 
The first essay examines the labor allocation problem of an opportunistic poacher 
harvesting an endangered species within a protected area.  The labor allocation 
problem is coupled with the species’ population dynamics to estimate how poaching 
responds to economic parameters over time.  The model provides insight into the 
relationship between species population dynamics, economic parameters, and 
biological parameters. Interesting and counterintuitive results are observed for a wide 
range of economic and biological parameters.   
 
Civil unrest and political instability have been associated with poaching.  In the 
second essay I examine an empirical data set on rhino poaching in Assam, India.  
 Assam witnessed a prolonged period of civil unrest and political instability during 
which rhino poaching increased dramatically.  The relationship between civil unrest 
and rhino poaching is identified through an econometric exercise.  I factor in the 
relationship between poaching and other variables associated with it – including black-
market rhino horn prices, potential size of black markets, and anti-poaching efforts.  
These variables are seen to have the predicted associations with poaching, and help 
identify the latter’s relationship with civil unrest.   
 
International criminal syndicates sponsor elephant poaching in Africa.  The third essay 
develops a dynamic a model of organized criminal poaching.  Under plausible 
conditions poaching is insensitive to black-market price of ivory, but changes 
dramatically with the probability of interception by anti-poaching patrols.  Parameter 
space is analyzed extensively to ascertain the effect of economic parameters on 
elephant population sustainability.  In the fourth essay I examine the strategic 
interaction between poachers and anti-poachers in a spatiotemporal setting.  A space is 
conceptualized within which meta-populations of elephants disperse temporally.  
Optimal locational strategies of poachers and anti-poachers are solved for, and their 
effects on elephant population dynamics are examined.   
 
Keywords: Rhinoceros unicornis; Loxodonta africana; poaching; stochastic 
population dynamics; bifurcation; deterministic chaos; civil unrest; strategic 
interaction.
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The harvesting of endangered or protected species is a major concern for 
environmental conservation.  Opportunistic poachers react according to economic 
incentives and disincentives underlying conservation policy.  The sustainability of 
protected species population would depend on how poaching behavior is affected by 
changes in economic or policy parameters.  The first essay (Chapter 2) develops a 
labor allocation model of an opportunistic poacher harvesting a protected species 
within a protected area.  Economic or conservation policy parameters – such as fines 
for poaching, wage rates in and around the protected area, black market prices for the 
protected species, and anti-poaching enforcement – are fed into the model.  The model 
frames the labor allocation problem in the context of the protected species’ population 
dynamics.  In this essay we will examine the effect of changing economic parameters 
on both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of harvesting behavior and the 
resultant species population dynamics.  
 
In the next essay (Chapter 3) we will examine the effect that civil unrest and political 
instability in a region have on endangered species poaching.  In particular we will 
consider the case of the Kaziranga National Park in Assam, India, which witnessed a 
marked increase in the poaching of Indian rhinos that coincided with a prolonged 
period of civil unrest, militancy, and political instability in the region.  We will use 
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estimates of rhino population and poaching data to econometrically estimate a harvest 
function.  In this empirical exercise we will identify the relationship between civil 
unrest and rhino poaching.    
 
The protection of elephants in Southern Africa has become more difficult and 
dangerous with the advent of international syndicates that use organized crime to 
sponsor elephant poaching in Southern Africa.  In the next essay (Chapter 4) we will 
develop a dynamic model of organized poaching.  We will examine how the 
opportunistic behavior of the leader of a poaching organization is affected by high-
value returns of selling elephant tusks on the black market.  We will factor in the cost 
of poaching effort and the probability of getting intercepted by anti-poaching patrols.  
This enables us to model the operating life of a poaching organization as a stochastic 
process over time.  The economic decision-making process is coupled with the 
population dynamics of elephants in Southern Africa’s range states.  We will examine 
how poaching behavior is affected by economic parameters and the probability of 
interception by anti-poaching patrols.  The model of elephant population dynamics 
will also enable us to examine the sustainability implications of changes in economic 
parameters.   
 
With elephant poaching increasing markedly over the last decade and anti-poaching 
units having limited resources to protect them against poachers, anti-poaching units 
must act strategically in order to achieve effective protection.  Elephants are 
distributed over wide geographic regions and thereby it becomes important for 
3 
conservation policy to consider the spatial aspects of elephant population distribution.  
In the final essay (Chapter 5) we will develop a model that views poaching and 
protection as a repeated game between strategic opponents in space.  A space is 
conceptualized within which meta-populations of elephants disperse via seasonal 
migration.  Poaching and protection are introduced as strategic location-specific 
choices of the opponents in space.  The conceptual model will enable us to develop 
insight into the effect of various location choice strategies of poachers and anti-
poachers on elephant population dynamics.     
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CHAPTER 2 
 
POACHING AND THE DYNAMICS OF A PROTECTED SPECIES 
 
2.1   Introduction and Background 
Poaching is a threat to the survival of protected species in low-income countries.  Bio-
economic models account for the economic parameters that drive the incentive to 
harvest or poach under open access conditions under which poachers myopically 
maximize short-run profit, and entry and exit occur until rents are dissipated.  Such 
models predict equilibrium levels of endangered populations under various 
conservation policies such as trade bans  (Bulte & van Kooten, 1999a; Bulte & van 
Kooten, 1999b; Burton, 1999), fines for poaching  (Bulte & van Kooten, 1999a; Bulte 
& van Kooten, 1999b; Damania, Milner-Gulland, & Crookes, 2005; Damania, 
Stringer, Karanth, & Stith, 2003; Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams, 1992; Skonhoft 
& Solstad, 1998), alternative livelihoods to resolve conflict between land use and 
species conservation  (Fischer, Muchapondwa, & Sterner, 2011; Johannesen & 
Skonhoft, 2005; Skonhoft, 2007; Winkler, 2011), and black market price-control 
through supply restrictions  (Brown & Layton, 2001; Kremer & Morcom, 2000; 
Mason C.F., Bulte E.H., & Horan R.D., 2012).  Such models analyze steady states and 
the dynamics of open access resource systems using the Gordon-Schaefer framework, 
which essentially models a dynamic system with two differential or first-order 
difference equations representing harvest effort and species growth net of harvest 
(Bulte, 2003).  Species growth is often modeled using a logistic function, and harvest 
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is represented by a Schaefer or Cobb-Douglas production function.   (Bulte, 2003) 
extends the Gordon-Schaefer framework by the accounting for the relationship 
between harvest and species population abundance.  Harvest is determined by the 
abundance of species population and prey switching can take place at low prey 
densities.  Bulte finds that the traditional result of a unique and stable steady state 
under open access in the long run might be misleading, and that multiple equilibria or 
steady states might exist that are driven by small changes in the underlying economic 
parameters used in the model.   
Ecologists have noted that discrete-time models of species populations may 
exhibit seemingly random or chaotic behavior  (Hastings & Powell, 1991; May RM, 
1976) because the stability of steady states in such dynamical systems are dependent 
on the values of model parameters  (Edelstein-Keshet, 1988; Hale, Jack K.,Koçak, 
Hüseyin., 1991).  (May RM, 1976) first showed how parameter variation in a first-
order difference equation may cause steady state values to become unstable.  For some 
range of parameter values there may exist critical values at which a qualitative change 
in the behavior of the dynamical system occurs.  Oscillatory and chaotic population 
behavior has been observed empirically.  For instance ecologists have found, on 
examination of historical data on the fur trade of the Canadian lynx (Lynx canadensis), 
that increased trapping effort on the part of fur traders seemed to induce high-
amplitude chaotic behavior in the lynx population  (Gamarra & Ricard, 2000; 
Schaffer, 1985).  These studies deduce that the amplitude of population cycles is 
affected by changes in pelt price for lynx and in some cases results in counterintuitive 
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population dynamics.  Ecologists find that dynamic natural systems are generally 
unstable over long time horizons  (Gamarra & Ricard, 2000; Schaffer, 1985).   
Predictions of species population behavior merit careful study.  Abrupt 
qualitative changes in population behavior may come about by changes in economic 
and biological parameters.  In this chapter we develop a model of poaching in a 
protected area that houses a protected species.  We study the qualitative effects of 
economic and biological parameter changes on poaching behavior, as well as the 
resultant effects on protected species’ population dynamics.  The economic parameters 
that we examine include the black market price of the protected species, the fine for 
poaching, the wage rate from employment in and around the protected area, and anti-
poaching enforcement.  We also examine changes in the biological parameters that can 
be used to represent different types of species.  We provide extensive numerical 
analyses of parameter space for both economic parameters and biological parameters.  
Our results serve as an extension of the findings of previous studies which deduce that 
dynamic natural systems are either unstable in the long run or have non-unique steady 
states driven by changes in the model’s economic and biological parameters.  The 
model reveals that policy parameter variations induce abrupt qualitative changes in 
poaching and population behavior.     
In section 2.2 we present a model of illegal harvest or poaching based on a 
system of two first-order difference equations.  We study the effects of poaching on 
population dynamics with the help of numerical comparative static exercises.  The 
numerical results are presented in section 2.3.  Section 2.4 provides a discussion of the 
numerical results and possible implications for conservation policy.  
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2.2   A Model of Risky Open Access 
In this section we develop a bio-economic model of poaching to study its effects on 
species’ dynamics and poacher utility.  Let us consider a poacher living near a 
protected area (PA) who allocates time to poaching, non-poaching employment and 
leisure.  The poacher accordingly derives utility from consumption of harvest, income 
from non-poaching employment and black market sales, and leisure time.  The 
poacher maximizes a utility function subject to time and budget constraints in each 
time period for a finite time horizon.  The protected species’ population dynamics is 
modeled using a growth function and a poaching production function.  Poaching is 
subject to risky open access, whereby a fine is incurred for being caught poaching by 
an anti-poaching patrol.  The poacher solves for the optimal sequences of poaching 
time, non-poaching employment time and leisure time.  We first provide the general 
mathematical form of the bio-economic model and the resulting constrained-
maximization conditions.  Later we use specific functional forms for utility, 
population growth, poaching production and probability functions.  
We define E[  ]   (    [  ]   
 ) as the poacher’s expected utility in time 
period  , where    is the consumption of the endangered species from the preserve in 
period  , E[  ] is the expected income in period  , and   
  is the leisure time in period 
 .   We define   
  to be the time spent poaching and   
  to be the time spent in non-
poaching employment in and around the PA in period  .  Accordingly we define   to 
be the time constraint for each period as     
    
    
 .  
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We define a poaching production function as     (  
    ), where    
represents the harvested amount from the PA and    is the protected species 
population in period  .  The poacher consumes    out of    and sells the remainder 
(     ) at a price,    on the black market.  The poacher also allocates time towards 
non-poaching employment (  
 ) within the PA and earns a wage rate of   in period 
 .  We define    to be the fine that the poacher pays for being caught by an anti-
poaching patrol in period  .  Since poaching is risky, we define  (  
 ) to be the 
probability of getting caught poaching.  This implies that the expected fine in period   
is given by  (  
 )  , and therefore the total expected income of the poacher is given 
by  [  ]  (     )       
   (  
 )  .  
Given these definitions expected utility takes the form  (    [  ]   
 )  
 (   (     )       
   (  
 )       
    
 ) where we assume that 
       .  The protected resource is assumed to evolve as per the iterative map: 
         (  )   (  
    ) i.e. generations of the protected species or the 
renewable resource are assumed to overlap.  The utility maximizing poacher views    
as given and does not know or concern himself with how his actions will affect     .  
The poacher solves a static time allocation problem in each period  , given the level of 
resource stock and the risk of a fine.  The constrained-optimization problem is set up 
as follows:  
   
{     
    
 }
   
 ∑    (    [  ]   
 )     subject to:  
  
      
    
 ,  
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 [  ]  (     )       
   (  
 )  , and          (  )  
 (  
    ). 
 
  is the discount factor and   is the finite time horizon in this time allocation 
problem.  The Lagrangean ( ) is set up as follows:  
  ∑   { (   (     )       
   (  
 )       
    
 )      
     (    (  )   (  
    )      )}  
 
With the assumption that the poacher is myopic and does not account for the 
future value of the stocks we set        .  The resulting first-order constrained-
optimization conditions are as follows: 
{
  ( )
   
 
  ( )
   
  }                      (2.1) 
{
  ( )
   
[
  ( )
   
      (  
 )  ]  
  ( )
   
 }   
      
      (2.2) 
{
  ( )
   
   
  ( )
   
 }   
      
         (2.3) 
 [  ]  (     )       
   (  
 )       (2.4) 
  
      
    
         (2.5) 
 
Equations (2.1) through (2.5) can be solved simultaneously for   ,   
 ,   
 ,    
and   
  given      and parameter values for   ,    and   . Once we solve for   
  
we can use the iterative map          (  )   (  
    ) to calculate the next 
period’s renewable resource stock,     . Then we use Equations (2.1) through (2.5) to 
solve for     ,     
 ,     
 ,      and     
   given       . From the iterative map we 
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will have            (    )   (    
      ). This process is continued until the 
finite time horizon,  . A steady state is reached if   ,   
 ,   
 ,    and   
  are 
unchanging, i.e. where net growth equals harvest:   (  )   (  
    ).  
We specify functional forms for poacher utility, the harvest function, species 
population growth, and the probability of getting caught poaching. The poacher’s 
utility is represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function specified in Equation (2.6), 
where                          .  Note that      is not 
necessary for a positive level of utility.    
     [  ]
 (  
 ) (     
 )     (2.6) 
 
A Schaefer production function is specified in Equation (2.7) for the poaching 
production function, where     is a poaching technology or efficiency parameter.  
 (  
    )     
           (2.7) 
 
We use a modified logistic population growth function from previous studies  
(Cromsigt, Hearne, Heitkonig, & Prins, 2002; Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams, 
1992).    represents the intrinsic growth rate of the protected species,   is the carrying 
capacity of the protected area and   is a skew parameter in the growth function; a 
value of     causes the population level supporting peak growth to lie to the right of 
   .  (Cromsigt et al., 2002; Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams, 1992) discuss how 
different values of   can be used to represent different species.  
 (  )     (  (   ⁄ )
 )       (2.8) 
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As we mentioned previously poaching is a risky activity for the individual, 
whereby a fine is incurred for being caught poaching by an anti-poaching patrol.  
Probability functions can be formulated to include the property that the probability of 
getting caught increases with the proportion of time spent poaching or harvesting (see:  
(Copeland, Brian Richard., Taylor, M. Scott,National Bureau of Economic Research., 
2004; Damania et al., 2005).  We model riskiness with a probability function specified 
in Equation (2.9), which satisfies this property; when   
    we have  (  
 )   , 
and when   
    we have  (  
 )   .1  Note that as   declines the probability of 
being caught while poaching increases.  In this probability function The parameter   
can be taken to represent the effectiveness of anti-poaching enforcement within the 
PA; the more effective the anti-poaching patrols are in apprehending the poacher, the 
lower would be the value of  . 
 (  
 )  (  
  ⁄ )    (  (    
 ))     (2.9) 
 
Using Equations (2.6) – (2.9), we derive the first order constrained-
optimization conditions.  We evaluate the first-order conditions in steady state by 
setting          , dropping the   subscripts from the choice variables 
           , and deriving the following expressions:  
         (     )          (2.10) 
   (  (        )  (     )e  (   
 )   ⁄ )           (2.11) 
                                                 
1 We use the simplifying assumption that the probability of getting caught poaching and the probability 
of paying the fine are the same.  While we can include a joint probability of getting caught poaching 
and paying the fine, no additional insight would be garnered from the model.  
12 
                             (2.12) 
 
 We note that    (  (  ⁄ )  ) in steady state and that therefore we 
derive 𝜕 (⋅) 𝜕  
 ⁄    (        ).  Equations (2.10) – (2.12) can be numerically 
solved for the steady state values of the decision variables            .  We can use 
these values to derive the steady state value of the resource stock,  .  This is done for 
a set of base-case parameter values, which are listed in Table 2.1.  
Table 2.1: Steady state values of the Risky Open Access model under base-case model 
parameters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Parameters Values Decision variables    
 = 1    0.0316 Maximized utility= 1.5046 
 = 1   = 0.5892   
 = 1   = 0.1634   
 = 1     
 = 1 Steady state values:    
 = 0.3     0.4108 Equation (2.10)= 1.23E-06 
 = 5     0.2420 Equation (2.11)= 1.78E-07 
 = 0.3     0.8246 Equation (2.12)= -1.00E-07 
 = 5      0.2474   
 = 1  (  )    0.3907   
 = 1     
 = 1     
 = 1     
 = 1     
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2.3   Numerical Analyses  
Table 2.1 shows the steady state values of the resource stock and the decision 
variables.  We can numerically solve for the optimal sequence of {     
    
 }   
    for 
a given initial value for the resource stock,   .  Let us consider an initial value of 
      .  We numerically solve for      
    
  using Equations (2.1) – (2.3).  Then 
we use the iterative map        (  )   (  
    ) to calculate    and 
numerically solve for      
    
  in the next time period    1.  The simulation 
exercise is conducted for one hundred time periods i.e.       to check for 
convergence to a steady state value of the population over time.  
 
 Figure 2.1 depicts a simulation of the risky open access model using the base-
case parameter values listed in Table 2.1 for the time horizon            with initial 
stock       .  The plots for the resource stock (  ) and the time spent poaching 
(  
 ) show convergence to the steady state values of 0.4108 and 0.5892 respectively 
via damped overshoot after     .  We note that the steady state values correspond to 
those listed in Table 2.1.  
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Figure 2.1: Approach dynamics of the resource stock,    (solid line) and poaching 
time,   
  (dashed line) using base case parameter values of Table 2.1. 
 
From Figure 2.1 it is evident that when the stock level is high the time spent 
poaching is also high, and when the stock declines, so does the poaching time.  Thus 
the changes in poaching time follow the changes in the abundance and scarcity of the 
resource stock.  In Figure 2.1 we see that the stock converges to the previously 
calculated steady state and       0 lies in the “basin of attraction”. 
2
     
We noted earlier that for a certain range of parameter values there may exist 
critical values or “bifurcation points,” for which we observe abrupt changes in the 
qualitative behavior of the dynamical system being modeled.  Bifurcation diagrams 
can be used to show the values of the parameter at which the dynamical system moves 
                                                 
2 The steady state value of          is locally stable, because |  ( )|    where  ( )    
  (  (  ⁄ ) )      ; |  ( )|         when evaluated at         , i.e. the steady state.  
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from steady state to period-doubling bifurcation, and then eventually to “deterministic 
chaos”; deterministic because the parameters are not random variables in our model.    
The parameters in our risky open access model include the wage rate (  ) for 
employment in and around the PA, the fine (  ) imposed for being caught poaching 
and the effectiveness of anti-poaching enforcement ( ).  The price of the species sold 
on the black-market ( ) can be considered as an indirect policy parameter, i.e. 
confiscated harvest by anti-poaching patrols can be dumped on local markets causing 
the black-market price to fall, and thereby create a disincentive to poach.  These 
parameters can be referred to as policy parameters in that they might be directly or 
indirectly controlled by the manager of the PA.  Changes in the values of policy 
parameters may facilitate a renewal of population from low levels, but with the 
possibility of chaotic behavior, policy may well induce widely oscillating population 
trends over time.  The biological parameters in our model are the intrinsic growth rate 
( ) of the protected species, the skew parameter ( ) in the logistic growth function, 
and the size of the PA or the carrying capacity ( ).  We can represent different 
species in our model with different values of   and  .  Small mammals would have 
higher reproductive rates (i.e. higher values of   in the model) compared to large or 
mega-fauna species; the latter can be represented by lower values of   (Eberhardt, 
1987).  The modified logistic growth function with the skew parameter ( ) allows for 
non-linearity in the relationship between    and the strength of population density-
dependence (     ⁄ ).  For modeling mega-fauna there is empirical evidence for 
values of    ; density-dependence becomes more important for large mammals 
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when their population is closer to the environmental carrying capacity ( ) (Cromsigt 
et al., 2002; Eberhardt, 1987).    
In the analysis of our bio-economic model we shall study the changes in 
qualitative behavior of the protected population dynamics and poaching time for 
changes in the economic parameters, which include the wage rate ( ), the poaching 
fine ( ), the black-market price ( ), and the effectiveness of anti-poaching 
enforcement ( ), as well as for different values of the biological parameters, which 
include the intrinsic growth rate ( ), and the skew parameter ( ).  Bifurcation diagrams 
of   for different combinations of  ,  , and   could provide insight on the 
effectiveness of anti-poaching policy in conserving populations of different species.  
This has the potential of providing an integrative analysis of the economics and the 
ecology of species conservation policy.     
We begin our comparative static exercises by changing the wage rate   from 
its base case value of 1 to a value of 1.5 (i.e. a fifty percent increase in wage rate from 
its base-case value).  All other parameter values retain the same values of Table 2.1.  
The resulting simulation is shown in Figure 2.2.  What we observe is that    and   
  
oscillate with increasing amplitude until      and afterwards they both oscillate 
within a two-point cycle with    {             } and   
  {             }. 
When           the stock is so low as to only induce a   
         from the 
expected utility-maximizing poacher.  When           poaching is more attractive 
and poaching effort increases to   
        , i.e. by a factor of 6.67.  Given this 
observed two-point cycle pattern when      , we suspect that further increases in 
  will lead to cycles of    and ultimately deterministic chaos in the evolution of the 
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resource stock   .  Figure 2.3 plots the bifurcation points for changes in the parameter 
values of  - it shows the resource stock,   , for increments of 0.005 in the interval 
  [     ].  The critical values, or “bifurcation points,” occur in the range   
[     ].  Bifurcation diagrams, like in Figure 2.3, provide us with information about 
the qualitative dynamics of the resource stock for a given range of parameter values.  
For instance in Figure 2.3 in the interval   {     } we note that when   
{         } the lower bound of which is smaller than the resource stock levels when 
  {       }.  This result shows that policy aimed at increasing the wage rate might 
have unintended consequences of a lower resource stock level.   
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Dynamics of the resource stock,    (light) and poaching time,   
  (dark) 
when  increases to 1.50   
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Figure 2.3: Bifurcation points and steady state values in the dynamics of    (vertical 
axis) for increments of 0.005 in values of  [     ] (horizontal axis) 
 
Next we study the effects of changes in the fine ( ) for getting caught 
poaching.  Figure 2.4 plots the bifurcation points for increments of 0.005 in the 
parameter values of   in the interval [   ].  The critical values (bifurcation points) 
occur approximately at    0.3 and 0.47.  This tells us that when the fine is reduced 
from its base-case level of 1 to a little below 0.50 (i.e. half the base-case level) we 
observe a period-doubling bifurcation in the resource stock dynamics.  Chaotic 
behavior in the resource stock dynamics occurs when    0.3 and the resource stock 
attains steady state values in the range with no bifurcations in the resource stock.  The 
level of the steady state values is seen to increase when the fine is increased, which 
serves intuition since an increasing poaching fine would lower the marginal 
productivity of the time spent poaching   
 .   It is interesting to note that when the 
level of the fine is reduced to zero the resource stock value does not decline to zero.  
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This is because the marginal product of the time spent poaching   
  goes to zero as 
    , while at the same time the marginal product of wage labor time remains at 
      (remember in these comparative static numerical exercises we change one 
parameter at a time while maintaining the other parameters at their base-case values 
listed in Table 2.1).    
 
 
Figure 2.4: Bifurcation points and steady state values in the dynamics of    (vertical 
axis) for increments of 0.005 in values of   [   ] (horizontal axis).   
 
We now examine the bifurcation points in the third economic parameter- the 
black market price  - for the range   [   ] as shown in Figure 2.5.  Period-
doubling bifurcation begins to occur in the resource stock values when the black 
market price is lowered to the range of [   ]   When the value of   increases above 
this range we note that the resource stock attains steady state values with no 
bifurcation occurring.  The resource stock steady state level does decline, which serves 
intuition since an increasing black market price would increase the marginal 
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productivity of the time spent poaching   
 .  This tells us that increasing black market 
prices might tend to reduce the resource stock to lower levels that are locally stable, 
unique, steady state values.          
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Bifurcation points and steady state values in the dynamics of    (vertical 
axis) for increments of 0.005 in values of   [   ] (horizontal axis).   
 
The last policy parameter that we examine is the effectiveness of anti-poaching 
enforcement ( ).  Figure 2.6 plots the bifurcation points for increments of 0.005 in the 
parameter values of   in the interval [   ].  Recall from Equation (2.9) that a higher 
value of   result in a lower probability of capture, and so would imply a reduced level 
of effectiveness of anti-poaching patrols.  For   (      ] we note that the resource 
stock attains unique, locally stable, steady state values with no bifurcation occurring.  
The resource stock steady state level does decline, which serves intuition since 
lowering the effectiveness of anti-poaching enforcement lowers the probability of 
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detection.  Therefore the poacher would spend relatively more time poaching 
compared to other activities; in other words the marginal productivity of the time spent 
poaching,   
 , increases for the poacher.  For   [      ] we observe two-point 
cycles.  This tells us that increasing the effectiveness of anti-poaching patrols 
(lowering the value of  ) does not always lead to higher steady state levels in the 
resource stock, i.e. the lower limit of the bifurcation or critical values are lower than 
some range of steady state values.  Next we show that counterintuitive dynamics can 
emerge from our comparative static numerical exercise when modeling different type 
of protected species.    
 
 
Figure 2.6: Bifurcation points and steady state values in the dynamics of    (vertical 
axis) for increments of 0.005 in the interval   [   ] (horizontal axis).  
 
We turn our attention to the qualitative dynamics when we model different 
types of species.  Different values of biological parameters in the logistic growth 
function have been used to study he population dynamics of different types of species.  
Values of    1 are used to model population dynamics of large mammal species 
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(Cromsigt et al., 2002).  Different values of the net intrinsic growth rate ( ) in the 
logistic growth function can represent different species.  Empirical estimates find 
small values of   (low reproductive rates) for large mammals and high values of   for 
small mammals (Eberhardt, 1987).  First we change the value of the skew parameter   
to represent different mammal species being modeled.  Figure 2.7 plots the bifurcation 
points for increments of 0.005 in the parameter values of   in the interval [   ], but 
this time when we change the value of   to 2.  Note that when the anti-poaching 
effectiveness increases (i.e. the value of   reduces, which then increases the 
probability of anti-poaching patrols intercepting the poacher) the resource stock attains 
locally stable, unique, steady state values.  However for   in the range [   ] we note 
that the steady state stock levels reduce.  In Figure 2.6 we saw that increasing the 
effectiveness of anti-poaching patrols beyond a critical value leads to bifurcations in 
the stock level.  This comparative static exercise reveals that it is possible to have 
counterintuitive results when one increases the effectiveness of anti-poaching patrols, 
particularly when different species are being modeled with different skew parameter 
values.     
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Figure 2.7: Steady state values in the dynamics of    (vertical axis) for increments of 
0.005 in the interval   [   ] for a variation in the skew parameter from its base-case 
value, i.e.      (  ).   
 
We use these comparative static numerical exercises to derive combined 
insight on the effects of changing levels of both biological and economic parameters 
on the qualitative population dynamics.  First we examine the effects of changing 
levels of the intrinsic growth rate ( ) in conjunction with different levels of anti-
poaching enforcement effectiveness ( ).  We do this by simulating the time paths of 
the resource stock,   , for combinations of values of   {                     } 
and   {          }.  Once we derive the time paths for each combination of   and 
 , we record the points in the time paths of    at which the qualitative behavior 
changes from steady state to period-doubling bifurcation. In Figure 2.8 we record the 
qualitative behavior of the resource stock's equilibrium points for the values of   
(along the horizontal axis) in conjunction with values of   (along the vertical axis).  
The legend on the right hand side in Figure 2.8 indicates the qualitative behavior of 
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species dynamics: convergence to steady state shown in dark blue, two-point cycles 
shown in light blue/green, four-point cycles shown in yellow, eight-point cycles 
shown in orange/red, and finally “deterministic” chaos shown in dark red.  
 
 
Figure 2.8: Qualitative behavior of the resource stock,   , for combinations of values 
of the intrinsic growth rate   {                     }  (horizontal axis), and the 
anti-poaching effectiveness parameter   {          } (vertical axis).    
 
For any given value of   on the vertical axis as we move across the grid (i.e. 
left to right) we have color-coded cells depicting the qualitative features of the 
equilibrium points for different values of   on the horizontal axis.  Figure 2.8 tells us 
how the changing effectiveness of anti-poaching enforcement affects the stability 
characteristics of the equilibria for different species represented by different intrinsic 
growth rates,  .  Conversely for any given value of   (i.e. any one particular species 
being modeled) as we move from bottom to top in Figure 2.8 we see how the changing 
effectiveness of anti-poaching enforcement affects the qualitative dynamics of a 
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particular species.  From Figure 2.8 we observe that for smaller values of  , we have 
locally stable, unique, steady states of the resource stock for low values of  .  For 
those same values of  , as we move up the vertical axis, we are seeing a slackening in 
the effectiveness of anti-poaching enforcement, and the resource stock begins to give 
way to two-point cycles, four-point cycles, eight-point cycles and eventually to 
deterministic chaos.  For high values of   on the horizontal axis, low values of   do 
not always produce locally stable, unique, steady state values.  However for those high 
values of  , it appears that as the effectiveness of anti-poaching enforcement slackens, 
we begin to observe unique, locally stable, steady state values of the resource stock.  
Another result we found from this numerical exercise, which is not depicted in Figure 
2.8, was that for all values of   increasing the value of   led to declining average 
values of the resource stock – in terms of average steady state values or average values 
of the bifurcation points.   
In essence what Figure 2.8 tells us is that different levels of anti-poaching 
enforcement have variable effects on the qualitative aspects of population dynamics 
for different species as represented by different intrinsic growth rates.  As far as policy 
insight that can potentially be garnered from Figure 2.8 our results suggest that if 
policy makers wish to avoid chaotic population dynamics for mega-fauna species with 
low-  values, the effectiveness of anti-poaching patrols/enforcement needs to be 
relatively better than in the case of protecting high   species or small mammals.  In 
Figure 2.8 we see that for high-  species (i.e.    0.60) increasing the effectiveness of 
anti-poaching enforcement (reducing   from the range [    ] to the range [   ]) 
results in period doubling bifurcation in the resource stock.     
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Lastly we examine the effects of changing levels of the skew parameter ( ) in 
conjunction with different levels of anti-poaching enforcement effectiveness ( ).  
Recall from Figure 2.7 that increasing the anti-poaching effectiveness (i.e. lowering 
the value of  ) gave us counterintuitive results for some range of   values: for values 
of the skew parameter     the steady state stock levels began to decline when anti-
poaching enforcement was made more effective.  In figure 2.9 we use a color-coded 
grid to depict at what combinations of   and   the resources stock,  , goes from 
steady state to two-point cycles.  Two-point cycles are shown in yellow, and the 
steady states are shown in different shades of green- darker green indicates higher 
average steady state resource stock values for the range of   values, and lighter green 
indicates lower average steady state values.  For any given   value as we move down 
the grid we have increasing values of   (i.e. lower levels of anti-poaching 
effectiveness).  For     when   increases from   through   we observe decreasing 
steady state   values.  This serves intuition because as the effectiveness of anti-
poaching enforcement decreases, the marginal product of poaching time (  
 ) would 
increase, and we would expect lower stock values.  Recall that higher values of   are 
used to model larger mammals (Cromsigt et al., 2002).  So as we move across the grid 
in Figure 2.9 we are modeling the population dynamics of larger mammals.  The 
counterintuitive results seen in Figure 2.7 are also noted here in Figure 2.9 for larger   
values: i.e. increasing the effectiveness of anti-poaching patrols leads to decreasing 
steady state values of the resource stock,  .  This is consistent for values of   [   ] 
for decreasing   values in the range [   ].  We provide a summary of the key results 
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from our numerical analysis in Table 2.2 for each of the economic and biological 
parameters in our model.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Qualitative behavior of the resource stock,   , for combinations of values 
of the skew parameter   {       } and the anti-poaching effectiveness parameter 
  {       }.   ̅: average value of resource stock.   
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Table 2.2: Summary of key numerical results.  
 
Parameter Effect of 
increasing 
parameter value 
on time spent 
poaching (  
 ) 
Effect of 
increasing 
parameter value 
on resource stock 
(  ) 
  -point cycles 
observed? 
Additional 
comments 
Wage rate ( )     High-amplitude 
dynamics for 
      a 
Deterministic 
chaos for 
       
Fine ( )     Low-amplitude 
dynamics for 
       
Deterministic 
chaos for 
       
Black market 
price ( ) 
    High-amplitude 
dynamics for 
   .  
Deterministic 
chaos for higher 
values of   
(  ), when 
    
Intrinsic growth 
rate ( ) 
n.a. n.a. High-amplitude 
dynamics for 
low-  values 
when    .  
Greater anti-
poaching 
effectiveness 
needed to protect 
low-  species if 
steady state 
preferred to 
high-amplitude, 
chaotic, 
population 
dynamics by 
policy maker.  
Anti-poaching 
effectiveness 
( ) 
        Bifurcation when 
    and 
  [   ].  
For     low   
values (i.e. 
   ) reduce 
steady state   
values.   
a
 Refer to Table 2.1 for the set of base-case parameter values.  
  indicates an increase;   indicates a decrease;     indicates an ambiguous effect.  
  
 
2.4   Conclusion  
Robert  (May RM, 1976) introduced the idea of how small parameter changes in a 
logistic growth equation leads to very complicated dynamics or   -point cycles in the 
evolution of resource stocks.  In discrete-time models of single species ecologists have 
shown how dynamical systems can exhibit seemingly random or chaotic behavior, 
which results when the stability of steady states are dependent on the values of model 
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parameters  (Edelstein-Keshet, 1988; Hale, Jack K.,Koçak, Hüseyin., 1991; Hastings 
& Powell, 1991).  Erwin  (Bulte, 2003) shows that multiple equilibria or steady states 
might exist in open access systems, and that equilibria are affected by small changes in 
the underlying economic parameters.  The analysis and results of our chapter serves as 
an extension of previous studies of ecological-economic dynamic systems.  We have 
shown, through extensive comparative static exercises, how small changes in both 
economic parameters and biological parameters can lead to complicated dynamics in 
the behavior of a protected species’ population.  
Given the nature of Equations (2.7) and (2.8) – a Schaefer production function 
and a logistic growth function – in our open access model, bifurcation diagrams reveal 
important behavioral aspects of poaching and its effects on population or renewable 
resource stock dynamics.  Bifurcation diagrams have the potential to provide insight to 
policy makers who are considering changes in parameters as part of conservation 
policy.  Simply increasing the wage rate,  , or lowering the black market price,  , 
might not always lead to higher steady state stock levels of a protected species.  The 
resource stock can exhibit high-amplitude chaotic dynamics for even small changes in 
policy parameters.  The economic and ecological aspects of our bio-economic model 
are readily apparent when we record the bifurcation points of the resource stock,  , for 
combinations of values of   (intrinsic growth rate) and   (effectiveness parameter of 
anti-poaching enforcement), as well as for combinations of values of   and   (skew 
parameter in logistic growth function).  The results in Figures 2.8 and 2.9 suggest that 
there is no “one-size-fits-all” conservation policy when it comes to protecting species, 
as represented by different intrinsic growth rates and skew parameters.  When 
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protecting large mammal species with high   values, lowering the effectiveness of 
anti-poaching enforcement leads to decreasing steady state resource stock levels.  
However we found that increasing the effectiveness of anti-poaching enforcement 
beyond a certain critical point could result in counterintuitive dynamics wherein the 
steady state stock value declines.  The relevance of policy-induced bifurcation in the 
long-term behavior of renewable resources subject to opportunistic harvest merits 
careful consideration in the design or the study of conservation policy.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CIVIL UNREST AND THE POACHING OF RHINOS IN THE KAZIRANGA 
NATIONAL PARK, INDIA 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
The Kaziranga National Park (KNP), spread over an area of three hundred 
and seventy eight square kilometers, is located in the north-eastern state of Assam 
in India.  The state of Assam shares international borders with Bangladesh and 
Bhutan, and is geographically close to Myanmar.  A flagship species of the KNP is 
the greater one-horned rhinoceros (Rhinoceros unicornis) – also known as the 
Indian rhinoceros.  Concerns over rhino poaching led to the declaration of 
Kaziranga as a national park in January of 1974 in accordance with the Assam 
National Park Act, 1968 (Saikia, 2011).  Rhino poaching increased significantly in 
the 1980s through the mid-1990s in the state of Assam (refer to Table 3.1).  This 
time period coincided with extensive civil unrest in Assam.  The war of 
independence of Bangladesh (East Pakistan until March 1971) from West Pakistan 
in 1971 led to an exodus of ten million refugees to neighboring parts of India, 
including the state of Assam (UNHCR, 2012).  The large influx of refugees 
changed the demographics of Assam and made the task of identifying illegal 
residents difficult (ICM, 2012).  In 1979 mass movements led by native Assamese 
separatists campaigned for the detection of illegal migrants, for their removal from 
state voter lists, and for their deportation to Bangladesh   (Thakur & Pandey, 2009).  
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Secessionist tendencies began to form amongst the native Assamese in the late 
1970s and a militant organization called the United Liberation Front of Assam was 
established with the goal of separation from the Indian state (ICM, 2012).  This 
network of militant separatists was speculated to have carried out rhino poaching in 
Assam during the period of civil unrest in order to fund arms purchases through the 
illicit sale of rhino horn  (Agarwal, Narain, & Sen, 1999; Menon, 1996)  
During the late 1970s the Assam state government, led by the Congress (I) 
party, was more favorable to illegal immigrants because the immigrants formed a 
significant electoral voting block  (Thakur & Pandey, 2009).  Disagreement 
between the native Assamese separatists and the state government led to a 
breakdown of state administration, and Assam was brought under President’s rule 
in December of 1979 (ICM, 2012).  In 1980 the Indian Army was deployed in the 
state to maintain law and order.  Talks between the separatists and the central 
government made no progress between 1980 and 1983.  Elections were imposed by 
the Indian central government in 1983 despite opposition by the Assamese 
separatists.  The Congress (I) party came back to power, but the election result was 
deemed unacceptable by the separatists.  Attempts to force the separatists to accept 
the election result led to a breakdown of the state administration, and violence led 
to the deaths of over three thousand people   (Thakur & Pandey, 2009).   
A peace accord was signed between the separatists and the central 
government in 1985, which led to the dissolution of the Congress (I) state 
government, and the agreement to deport illegal immigrants.  A new regional 
political party, the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP), came to power after the signing of 
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the peace accord.  Secessionist sentiments remained strong despite the peace accord 
and new political leadership, which led to the continuation of civil unrest and armed 
conflict.  A lack of clearly defined rules to identify illegal immigrants meant that 
the provisions of the peace accord were not implemented meaningfully, and this 
only strengthened the secessionist sentiment.  In 1990, President’s rule was once 
again enforced and the Indian Army was used to subdue the militant separatists  
(Thakur & Pandey, 2009).  In 1993 another peace accord was signed between the 
state government (under the Congress (I) party) and the separatists, wherein army 
operations were suspended and amnesty was granted to surrendering militants.  The 
remaining militant separatists moved across the international border to Myanmar 
and Bhutan (ICM, 2012).   
This chapter studies an important but inadequately understood relationship 
between civil unrest and endangered species protection.  Animal species in tropical 
countries have been subject to poaching in regions that have witnessed political 
instability and civil unrest.  For instance, the Central African region has seen a 
prolonged period of civil strife along with escalated levels of poaching in the 
elephant range states (UNSC, 2013).  Civil unrest in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo is associated with gorilla poaching (WWF, 2014).  Given the political nature 
of extensive civil unrest in Assam during the 1980s and 1990s and the associated 
increase in rhino poaching, this chapter attempts to identify this relationship.  In the 
next section I describe the data on which the empirical analysis is based.  Section 
3.3 discusses a suitable biological model of population dynamics of the Indian 
rhinoceros.  Section 3.4 presents an identification strategy for quantifying the 
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relationship between rhino poaching and civil unrest, while accounting for several 
other variables that are probably associated with poaching – including black market 
rhino horn prices, the potential size of black markets, and anti-poaching efforts in 
the KNP.  The predicted associations of these variables with rhino poaching are 
described in Section 3.4.  Section 3.5 provides a discussion of the regression 
results, and section 3.6 concludes.   
 
3.2 The Data  
Census enumerations of the rhino population have been carried out by 
Assam’s State Forest Department every few years since the declaration of 
Kaziranga as a national park.  These data are listed in Table 3.1.  Civil unrest in 
Assam is indicated as a binary variable assuming a value of 1 in periods of 
extensive unrest and political instability, and a value of 0 in other time periods.  In 
addition I define an alternative variable representing civil unrest in Assam, which 
assumes integer values between 1 and 10 – with higher values representing periods 
of greater political instability, unrest, and militancy.  Rhino poaching incidents in 
the KNP are regularly recorded every year by Assam’s Forest Department.  The 
mean poaching level during the extensive civil unrest period (1980–1993, i.e. 14 
periods) is 32 rhinos per year compared to an average of 8 rhinos per year in the 
other time periods (1972–1979; 1994–2012, i.e. 27 periods).  The difference in 
means of rhino poaching per year in these two periods (samples) is 24.  A t-test of 
this difference derives a t-statistic of 7.62, which is statistically significant at the 
99% confidence level.     
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As a measure of the opportunity cost of poaching in Assam I consider two 
variables: agricultural labor wage rates and gross state domestic product per capita.  
Data on wage rates, gross state domestic product, and Assam’s human population 
are made available from various economic and population census reports.  A 
penalty or fine is imposed by Assam’s Forest Department for poaching.  The 
penalty as per the Indian Wildlife (Protection) Act (1972) and its subsequent 
amendments are listed in Table 3.1.  Assam’s Forest Department employs anti-
poaching staff or armed forest guards who regularly patrol the KNP to intercept and 
apprehend poachers (AFD, 2008).  The Forest Department has a de facto shoot-to-
kill policy, and more than one hundred poachers have been killed or arrested by 
forest guards since 1985 (Dutta, 2013).  At present there are one hundred and fifty 
two anti-poaching camps in the KNP with approximately six armed forest guards in 
each camp  (Gray, 2013).  In earlier time periods there were fewer anti-poaching 
camps and forest guards in the KNP.  Moreover, the anti-poaching camps’ 
infrastructure – including communication, anti-poaching equipment, and staff 
survival kits – has improved significantly in the 2000s  (AFD, 2008; Mathur, Sinha, 
& Mishra, 2005).  Table 1 lists the political party and chief minister in power in 
Assam.  Different categorical values are assigned to the political parties under the 
different chief ministers in order to account for variation in state policy over time.  I 
also note when President’s rule was enforced in the state.  The Muslim population 
is listed as per census reports and  (Sachar et al., 2006).      
There is evidence of organized crime in the supply side of the rhino horn 
black market.  Crime syndicates coordinate rhino horn supply through a network of 
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poachers and middlemen who source horns from national parks in South Asia and 
South Africa, and ship them to China and Vietnam  (Dutta, 2013; Sas-Rolfes, 2012; 
Somerville, 2012).  Table 3.1 lists the gross domestic products of China and 
Vietnam as a measure of the external market demand.  The few data of rhino horn 
price that poachers receive are listed in Table 3.1.  Given that there are no regular 
time-series estimates of horn prices, I consider two such measures.  As a first 
measure I assume a linear trend in the available information on horn prices to 
estimate the missing data points in Table 3.1.  As a second measure I estimate a 
horn price index using a structural model of horn supply and demand through an 
organized crime network (see APPENDIX 3.1).  Demand is assumed to be a 
function of horn price and income in China and Vietnam.  Supply is a function of 
horn price.  Given that crime syndicates source horns from South Africa and South 
Asia, I use time-series data on rhino poaching in South Africa as an instrument for 
index estimation.  Supply and demand functions are calibrated based on the 
assumption that the crime syndicate seeks to minimize the difference between 
supply and demand.  This presumably ensures that horns move as quickly as 
possible from poacher to end consumer, and lowers the risk of getting caught by 
authorities (for instance, poachers are known to sell horns as quickly as possible to 
smugglers to avoid interception by authorities (Sas-Rolfes, 2012)).  The index 
increases over time (see Table 3A.1) – reflecting the trend in the limited data on 
horn prices available to poachers.   
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Table 3.1: Empirical data 
 
a Talukdar (2000, 2002, 2003, 2006), Vigne & Martin (1998), and various Forest Department Annual Reports.  
b  (Agarwal et al., 1999; Thakur & Pandey, 2009) 
c Integer variable indicating extent of civil unrest based on Assam's history.  Higher values indicate periods of 
President’s rule, Indian Army deployments, and civilian deaths due to unrest. Lower values (1 – 2) indicate time 
periods of relative political stability in Assam.  
d Real daily agricultural wage rate in 2005 Indian Rupees (INR); time-series data on wage rates are available from 
various census reports for Assam.  Conversion to real rates using consumer price indices (CPI) for Assam  
(Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Various years; Jose, 1988; Rao, 1980). 
e GDP per capita (2005 INR; sources – various Assam state population and economic census reports).  With no 
population census conducted in 1981 the population estimates are interpolated using growth rates between the 
1971 and 1991 Census. 
f Poaching penalties (2005 INR) as per Indian Wildlife Protection Act (1972) Section 51 and its Amendments in 
2003 and 2010 (MoEF, 2013).  
g Assam’s Forest Department set up 152 anti-poaching camps in KNP by 2012 (Gray, 2013) and 121 camps during 
the late 1990s and early 2000s (Mathur et al., 2005).  In the 2000s there were improvements made to the anti-
poaching camps’ infrastructure and equipment; additional staff/guards were also employed – this doubled from 
three armed guards per camp in earlier periods to six armed guards per camp in the 2000s (sources:  (AFD, 2008; 
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Gray, 2013), and author’s personal communication with Principal Chief Conservator of Forests (Wildlife) Assam 
office).  Given this doubling of number of armed guards per camp the number of anti-poaching camps in earlier 
periods is taken to be half of that in the 2000s to reflect the improvement in KNP’s anti-poaching efforts.  In 2006 
KNP was declared a tiger reserve, which facilitated additional staff employment (Dutta, 2013).  Information on 
poachers arrested/killed based estimates from  (AFD, 2008; Dutta, 2013; Gray, 2013; Talukdar, 2000).   
h GDP ('0,000,000s US$) of China and Vietnam in 2005 CPI prices:     
http://www.ers.usda.gov/datafiles/International_Macroeconomic_Data/Historical_Data_Files/HistoricalCPIsValues
.xls (accessed September 2013).  
i Reports of rhino horn prices (US$/kg) available to poachers: 1978-1981, 1985 (Sas-Rolfes, 1997); 1993  
(Milliken, Nowell, & Thomsen, 1993); 1997  (Vigne & Martin, 2000); 2002 (Talukdar, 2002); 2012 (Eustace, 
2012; Sas-Rolfes, 2012).  Missing data interpolated using linear trends.  US$ converted to 2005 INR using 
exchange rates (http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc/USDpages.pdf (accessed September 2013)).      
j Political party ruling Assam; INC_Sinha: Congress (I) under S.Sinha; JP_Borbora: Janata Party under G.Borbora; 
INC_Kesab: Congress (I) under K.Gogoi; INC_Saikia: Congress (I) under H.Saikia; AGP_Mhnta: Asom Gana 
Parishad under P.Mahanta; Pres_rule: President’s rule; INC_Gogoi: Congress under T.Gogoi.  
k Assam census reports and  (Sachar et al., 2006). 
 
3.3 A Population Model of Rhinos in the KNP  
Using the limited data on rhino census numbers I adopt the methodology of   
(Cromsigt et al., 2002) to estimate rhino population for the intervening years during 
which no census was conducted.  I estimate a rhino population model that best fits the 
observed data.  The approach adopted by  (Cromsigt et al., 2002) is to assume the 
relationship between the modeled population,   , and the observed census population, 
  , as Equation (3.1), where    is the error term with an assumed expected value of 
zero, and a variance of   .  For a given initial population size,      , the best possible 
estimates of the population model parameters can be computed by minimizing the sum 
of squared errors, ∑  
  (for the years when census data is available, i.e.   1972, 
1978, 1984, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1997, 1999, 2006, 2009, 2012).  A non-linear solver 
was used to find the parameters of the population model that minimized the sum of 
squared errors.    
 
         
(3.1) 
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For a population growth function  (Cromsigt et al., 2002) find that the 
modified logistic growth function gives the best fit to population data on South 
African black rhinos (Diceros bicornis).  Their modified logistic growth function fit 
observed black rhino population data better than other growth functions such as the 
exponential growth function, which has a constant specific growth rate  , and the 
ordinary logistic growth function.  The modified logistic growth function assumes the 
form:  (  )     (  (   ⁄ )
 ), where   is the carrying capacity and   (  ) is a 
skew parameter that allows for non-linearity in the relationship between    and the 
strength of density-dependence (     ⁄ ).  When modeling mega-fauna there is 
empirical support for     because density-dependence becomes more important 
when the population is closer to carrying capacity  (Cromsigt et al., 2002).  I use the 
time series data on poaching levels,   , to account for harvest subtracted from yearly 
growth,  (  ).  The iterative map (3.2) describes rhino population dynamics in the 
KNP: 
3
  
 
           (  (   ⁄ )
 )     
(3.2) 
  
                                                 
3 Alternatively one can consider another growth function:  
         (     )(  ((     )  ⁄ )
 ) 
Harvest,   , is not just a deductible term, as in Equation (3.2), and influences both   and  .  This is 
plausible when poaching takes place before species reproduction, or when poachers target only mature 
rhinos with larger horns for instance.  Calibrated values for this growth function are:    0.03132,    
109.795.  The two estimated populations have a correlation coefficient   0.9921.   
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Table 3.2: Population model’s parameter calibration  
Census populations (  ) Initial value guesses  Calibrated values 
         ,           
          ,           , 
          ,           , 
          ,           , 
          ,           , 
           
                
             
              
∑  
          ∑  
         
 
I use the given initial population level,      , as the starting value for the 
iterative map, i.e.        658.  I then assign initial guesses for the demographic 
model’s parameters      and   as per Table 3.2.  The optimized values for the 
parameters are reported in Table 3.2.  The best-fit value I obtain for    0.0484.  
Other studies – (Mason C.F. et al., 2012; Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams, 1992)– 
have used an intrinsic growth rate of        to model population dynamics of 
African black rhinos.  The best-fit skew parameter value I obtain for    7.5676.   
(Mason C.F. et al., 2012; Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams, 1992)use a skew 
parameter value of    ;  (Cromsigt et al., 2002) estimate a   value between 10 and 
28.  Rhino population estimates derived using the method of least squared errors are 
plotted in Figure 3.1.  These data are used to estimate a poaching model in the next 
section.    
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Figure 3.1: Estimated rhino population for      and   that minimizes ∑   
 
 .  The 
square blocks on the trend line indicate the census enumeration years.  
 
3.4 Estimating a Harvest Function and Identifying the Relationship between 
Civil Unrest and Rhino Poaching  
I assume an exponential harvest function (Spence, 1973) to model poaching, 
  :   
     (     )    (  e   (    )) 
(3.3) 
    rhino population in year   
  : harvesting effort (         ; as     ,      )  
 : catchability parameter (   ) 
Poudyal et al., (2009) use time-series data on rhino poaching in Nepal to 
estimate a reduced-form harvest function under the assumption of zero-profits with de 
facto open access.  The variables they consider in the profit function are the price 
received by local poachers for rhino horn ( ), quantity of horns harvested ( ( )), and 
0
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anti-poaching effort ( ).  Harvest,  ( ), is a function of the anti-poaching effort, 
poaching effort ( ), and the rhino population ( ).  They net out both the expected 
poaching fine ( (   )[    ]), where  ( ) is the probability of getting caught, and 
the cost of poaching ( ( ) ), where  ( ) is a function of the opportunity cost of 
poaching such as local wage rates ( ).  Under the assumption of zero profits, they 
solve for the reduced-form equilibrium poaching effort,   , which is a function of 
          .  There are other characteristics that might be pertinent to estimating 
poaching effort, for which one must rely on proxy information.  Poudyal et al. proxy 
the fines imposed on convicted poachers by poaching fines set as per Nepalese law.  
They proxy the international demand for rhino horn by East Asian gross domestic 
product, given that an inverse demand relationship determines black market horn 
price.   
I assume aggregate harvesting effort to be represented by a composite term 
   (                                            ), which is 
estimated econometrically using the data in Table 1 and the estimated rhino population 
from the previous section.  I define the individual terms of   :  
    civil unrest in Assam (binary and discrete [1, 10]) 
  : number of anti-poaching camps in KNP (or number of armed forest 
guards) 
  : poaching penalty in Assam 
    gross domestic product (GDP) per capita in Assam  
    agricultural labor wage rate in Assam  
  : GDP of China/Vietnam 
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  : black market horn price for poachers 
  : estimated price index (see Appendix)  
  : error term 
Rearranging the terms of Equation (3.3) yields an estimable Equation (3.4):  
  
  [      ⁄ ]    (                                
            )  
(3.4) 
 
The natural log term on the left-hand side of Equation (3.4) is taken to be the 
dependent variable in the regression models.  The exponential harvest function, 
Equation (3.3), requires that the constant term,  , be greater than zero.  Given the 
observed increase in rhino poaching during the period of extensive civil unrest in 
Assam, I predict that the coefficient of    will be positive (    ).  The presence of 
more anti-poaching camps and armed forest guards would increase the likelihood that 
poachers get caught and thereby reduce poaching (    ).  Poaching is predicted to 
decrease with the poaching penalty (    ).  I expect that Assam GDP per capita 
(  ) would have a negative effect on poaching (    ).  Similar to  (Poudyal, 
Rothley, & Knowler, 2009) I predict that since income of China and Vietnam would 
have a positive effect on poaching (    ).  Higher black market horn prices would 
create additional incentive to poach (    ).  Alternatively the horn price index,   , is 
predicted to be positively related to   , i.e.     .     should be used as a covariate in 
regression models without    and    to avoid the problem of multi-collinearity 
because    is used to estimate   .  Since    is multiplied through the parenthesis in 
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Equation (3.4) the regression coefficient estimates should be the opposite of the signs 
predicted:       , –      , –      , –      , –      , –      , 
–      , –      .   
Since poaching was higher during civil unrest one might encounter omitted 
variable bias in the regression coefficient estimates.  Such bias might occur when there 
is some variable that is correlated with both the dependent and the independent 
variables, and for which there are usually no data available   (Angrist & Pischke, 
2009).  To provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of the independent variable of 
interest (civil unrest) on the dependent variable (rhino poaching) an econometric 
model should include any determinants of the dependent variable that are also 
correlated with the independent variable of interest  (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).  I 
consider two instrumental variables to identify the relationship between civil unrest 
and rhino poaching: “ruling political party in Assam,” and “Muslim population in 
Assam”.  Given Assam’s historical context these instruments are probably associated 
with civil unrest, but not correlated with other independent variables that affect rhino 
poaching.   
 
3.5 Results and Discussion  
Equation (3.4) is econometrically estimated and the results are listed in Table 
3.3.  In the first model, (OLS_0), ordinary least squares (OLS) is used to examine the 
relationship between civil unrest and poaching.  The catchability coefficient,  , 
estimated at 0.0056, has the expected positive sign and is statistically significant.  The 
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civil unrest coefficient,   , has the predicted positive sign and is statistically 
significant.  The regression coefficients,   , are calculated by dividing      by –  , 
   1,…,8.  I calculate     -0.025 -0.006   4.46, which suggests that the unrest 
period in Assam was associated with at least four times more poaching effort per year 
as compared to the non-unrest time period.  This interpretation of    follows from the 
binary definition of civil unrest,   , in Equation (3.4).  One needs to consider 
additional covariates; this is done in model (OLS_1).  A higher number of anti-
poaching camps in the KNP appear to significantly reduce poaching.  Poaching 
penalty has an expected negative effect but is not statistically significant.  Other 
controls of GDP per capita and agricultural wages in Assam are not statistically 
significant.  The external demand for rhino horn appears to rise with income in China 
as predicted, but the coefficient (  ) is not statistically significant.  Similarly horn 
price coefficient (  ) is positively related to poaching.  I find that the relationship 
between unrest and rhino poaching is positive (    ) and significant.  The Durbin-
Watson statistic indicates that the error terms are not serially correlated.   
In model (OLS_2) I consider different covariates and again find the 
relationship between unrest and poaching to be positive and significant:     -0.022 -
0.0117   1.89, i.e. the unrest period is associated with nearly twice as much poaching 
effort per year.  A higher number of armed forest guards in KNP’s anti-poaching 
camps appear to significantly reduce poaching.  I also consider the GDP of both China 
and Vietnam,   , and find that income in these two countries is positively associated 
with poaching.  Similar to OLS_1 horn price,   , is positively related to poaching 
effort.  The poaching penalty coefficient (  ) has the predicted negative sign but is not 
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statistically significant.  In model (OLS_3) I consider the effect of the horn price 
index,   , which is estimated using the income of China and Vietnam.  The effect of 
the price index has the predicted positive effect and is significant.  Poaching penalty 
and anti-poaching camps reduce poaching significantly.  The catchability coefficient, 
 , is however not statistically significant.  In models (OLS_4) and (OLS_5) I note that 
   and    significantly increase poaching.  I check for endogeneity in the regression 
results by calculating the correlation between the error terms from the biological 
parameter calibration,    (equation (1)), and the regression residuals,   .  The  
  value 
(last row of Table 3.3) indicates very low correlation between these error terms.   
I now check for endogeneity caused by omitted variable bias.  Model (IV_1) 
uses the instrumental variable indicating the category of the political party ruling 
Assam.  The argument for using this instrument is that civil unrest was political in 
nature and there is no correlation between political parties and the other independent 
variables affecting rhino poaching.  The signs and statistical significance of the 
coefficients are similar to model (OLS_1).  Civil unrest and the catchability 
coefficients are positive and significant.  The test of the null hypothesis of over-
identifying restrictions is satisfied, given that there are more instruments (eight 
categories of political parties) than the endogenous variable.  The first stage F-statistic 
exceeds the benchmark of 10, which indicates a strong instrument  (Stock, Wright, & 
Yogo, 2002).  Including additional covariates appears not to change the magnitude of 
the civil unrest coefficient by much, which implies the instruments aren’t correlated 
with the covariates – a condition that satisfies the exclusion restriction in instrumental 
variable regression  (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).  The endogeneity test reports a 
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probability value of 0.6673 – indicating that civil unrest is not endogenous.  Model 
(IV_2) uses the instrument indicating population of Muslims in Assam.  The argument 
for using this instrument is that since unrest was the response of Assamese separatists 
to the illegal immigration of Muslims from neighboring Bangladesh, this population 
presumably affected poaching effort only indirectly through the unrest variable, and is 
not correlated with the other independent variables.  The results suggest that civil 
unrest was associated with twice as much poaching on average (i.e.     -0.021 -
0.011   2).  The first stage F-statistic is less than 10, which suggests that the 
instrument of Muslim population is not strong.  The Cumby-Huizinga test statistic 
produces a probability value of 0.321 suggesting that the error terms are not serially 
correlated.  
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Table 3.3: Regression estimates with dependent variable =   [      ⁄ ]  
 
 Observations   41; robust standard errors in parentheses; statistical significance at 1% (***), 5% (**), 10% (*) error levels.   
a 
Durbin-Watson test statistic for auto-correlation.  
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b
 Cumby-Huizinga chi-square test statistic’s p-value; null hypothesis: error terms not serially correlated at order one.    
c Hansen’s J-statistic for test of over-identifying restrictions when there are more instruments than endogenous variables.  
d 
Durbin-Wu-Hausmann test of endogeneity (p-value reported); null hypothesis: variables are exogenous. 
  
e 
Kleibergen-Paap LM test statistic for under-identification under null hypothesis (p-value reported). 
 
f
 First stage F-statistic of instrumental variable regression.  
                      g
 Correlation between residuals (  ) from equation (1) and regression residuals.  
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I conduct robustness checks using the alternative (non-binary) definition of 
civil unrest (see Table 3.1), and the alternative rhino population estimates (using 
growth equation in footnote 3).  In Table 3.4 under model (OLS_ 6) I use the same 
covariates as model (OLS_1) except that the unrest variable is non-binary.  Unrest is 
still positively and significantly associated with poaching except that the magnitude of 
   is lower because of the non-binary definition.  I note that the coefficients of 
catchability, anti-poaching, income in China, and horn prices have the same signs and 
magnitudes as those in OLS_1.  Model (OLS_7), which uses the alternative rhino 
population estimates and the same covariates as model (OLS_2), yields similar signs 
and magnitudes of the regression coefficients as the other models.  In model (IV_3) I 
use the political party instrument to check for omitted variable bias.  The results are 
similar to those in model (IV_1).  In model (OLS_8) I find no significant effect of the 
number of poachers arrested/killed by forest guards on reducing poaching.  Model 
(OLS_9), using the same covariates as model (OLS_5), shows that the difference 
between external GDP and domestic GDP (i.e. China+Vietnam–Assam) has a positive 
and significant effect on rhino poaching.  In model (OLS_10) I consider interactive 
terms of unrest with anti-poaching camps, GDP of China, and horn price for poachers.  
The interactive terms show the effect of these variables on poaching during civil 
unrest.  GDP of China is a significant determinant of poaching.  The poaching penalty 
coefficient is negative and significant.  The coefficient (    ) of the interactive term, 
unrest   horn price, is positive and significant, thus suggesting that price had a 
stronger effect on poaching during the civil unrest period.   
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Table 3.4: Robustness checks for regression estimates 
 
a
 Rhino population estimated using alternative growth function (see footnote 3 in the rhino population model section).  
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The main result of this chapter is that civil unrest is positively and 
significantly associated with rhino poaching in Assam – the unrest period is 
associated with up to four times more poaching effort per year compared to other 
time periods.  The results in this chapter are similar to those of  (Poudyal et al., 
2009) who find that civil unrest (defined as Maoist insurgency in Nepal) led to 
significantly higher rhino poaching; that anti-poaching by the Nepalese Forest 
Department significantly reduces poaching; that GDP in East Asia has a positive 
but insignificant effect on poaching; and that poaching penalty insignificantly 
reduces poaching.  In this chapter I find that anti-poaching efforts of the Assam 
Forest Department significantly reduce poaching; poaching penalty reduces 
poaching (significantly in OLS models 3,4,5,9,&10); Chinese and Vietnamese GDP 
are positively associated with poaching (significantly in OLS models 5,9,&10); and 
that both measures of horn price are positively associated with poaching 
(significantly in OLS models 3,4,&10).  
Having estimated Equation (3.4) I now fit the data on rhino poaching and 
population to the estimated trend to examine the goodness of fit of the regression 
results. The coefficients of the regression models (  &   ,    1,…,8) can be used 
to estimate rhino poaching levels,   , as given by Equation (3.3):    
  (   
    ), where    (                                
            ). Given that the actual rhino poaching data (  ) is 
econometrically estimated as   , the rhino population estimates can now be 
calculated using Equation (3.2):            (  (   ⁄ )
 )    .  This 
provides estimates of rhino population and poaching levels from 1972 through 
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2012.  I examine the goodness of fit between the data and estimates from models 
(OLS_1), (OLS_2), (IV_1), and (IV_3).  I plot the data and the estimates of 
poaching and population as per these regression models in Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 
3.5 respectively, and list the correlation coefficients between the data and the 
estimates.  I find that the ordinary least squares regression model, (OLS_1), 
suggests a correlation coefficient of 0.8668 between the poaching data and their 
estimates, which is higher than that in the instrumental variable regression models 
(IV_1) and (IV_3).  Model (OLS_2) does not appear to provide as good a fit in the 
poaching data and their estimates as the other models.  The correlation coefficient 
between the poaching data and their estimates from model (IV_2) that uses the 
Muslim population instrument is 0.7800; this is lower than 0.8636 – the 
corresponding correlation coefficient in model (IV_1) that uses the political party 
instrument.  This suggests that the model using the political party instrument yields 
better explanatory power than that using the Muslim population instrument.     
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Rhino Poaching: Data (blue line) & Estimation (red line) 
Correlation = 0.8668 
Rhino Population: Data (blue line) & Estimation (red line) 
Correlation = 0.9997 
Figure 3.2: Rhino poaching and rhino population fit between data and estimates (model OLS_1).  
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Rhino Poaching: Data (blue line) & Estimation (red line) 
Correlation = 0.8018 
Rhino Population: Data (blue line) & Estimation (red line) 
Correlation = 0.9994 
Figure 3.3: Rhino poaching and rhino population fit between data and estimates (model OLS_2).  
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Rhino Poaching: Data (blue line) & Estimation (red line) 
Correlation = 0.8636 
Rhino Population: Data (blue line) & Estimation (red line) 
Correlation = 0.9997 
Figure 3.4: Rhino poaching and rhino population fit between data and estimates (model IV_1); instrument = political party 
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Rhino Poaching: Data (blue line) & Estimation (red line) 
Correlation = 0.8033 
Rhino Population: Data (blue line) & Estimation (red line) 
Correlation = 0.9994 
Figure 3.5: Rhino poaching and rhino population fit between data and estimates as per (model IV_3); instrument = political party 
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3.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter I have examined the historical context of extensive civil unrest 
in Assam and the concurrent increase in rhino poaching.  Using data on rhino 
poaching in the Kaziranga National Park I have undertaken two exercises.  The first 
exercise is a calibration of the biological parameters of a rhino population growth 
function.  Given that animal census enumerations are expensive and not undertaken 
regularly in Assam, I have adopted the methodology of previous studies to estimate 
rhino population levels for time periods in which data aren’t available.  The 
empirically calibrated parameters are similar to those derived in other studies of rhino 
populations.          
In the second exercise this chapter identifies the relationship between extensive 
civil unrest and rhino poaching in Assam.  Given the illicit nature of rhino poaching 
one would encounter the problem of missing relevant data – such as regular time-
series data on black market rhino horn prices and international market demand for 
rhino horn.  Data unavailability could lead to omitted variable bias in econometric 
estimations.  In this chapter I have estimated proxies of such data.  Incomes of China 
and Vietnam, which proxy the market demand for rhino horn, are positively associated 
with poaching.  Both measures of horn prices (one being a linear trend in the limited 
data on horn prices, and the other being a novel index estimated using a structural 
model of supply and demand through an organized crime network) are also positively 
related to poaching.  In addition to including several covariates in the regression 
analyses – poaching penalties, Assam’s GDP, and agricultural wages – I have 
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considered anti-poaching policy of Assam’s Forest Department, which is seen to 
significantly reduce poaching.  Given that civil unrest is associated with political 
instability in Assam, and an unchecked influx of Muslim refugees from Bangladesh, I 
have accounted for probable endogeneity in the regression results by using two 
instruments – political party and Muslim population.  I find no evidence to suggest 
that the OLS models are endogenous.  This chapter finds that civil unrest in Assam is 
positively and significantly associated with rhino poaching in the KNP.  The results 
are robust to different specifications of the civil unrest variable, alternative rhino 
population estimates, and to the inclusion of several additional covariates.  This 
chapter studies an important and inadequately understood relationship between civil 
unrest, political instability, and the conservation of endangered species.   
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APPENDIX 3.1 
 
Estimating a Rhino Horn Price Index:  
Given the presence of organized crime networks in the supply of rhino horn from 
South Africa and Asia, and that demand comes primarily from China and Vietnam, 
I define the following terms:  
  (     )
  
Demand for Indian rhino horn;   : income in China and 
Vietnam;     0 is the estimable horn price index.  
  (     )    Number of Indian rhinos killed by poachers in year  ;    
represents civil unrest in Assam.   
     Total number of rhinos killed by poachers in South Africa.   
     (  )  Horn price index.  I treat    as an instrument for    because I 
assume that black market price is a function of poaching in 
South Africa.   
     Unobservable inventory of Indian rhino horn held by the crime 
syndicate.  
            (     )    (     ): change in Indian rhino horn inventory 
held by the syndicate over time.   
 
I assume the following functional forms for supply,   , and demand,   :  
  (     )    (  (  )   )     
  
  ,      0,    0 (3A.1) 
  (     )    (  (  )   )     
 
  ,         0,    0 (3A.2) 
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As noted in The Data section the crime syndicate presumably has an incentive to 
maintain as low a difference between horn supply and demand levels.  This could 
ensure that horns move as quickly as possible from poacher to end consumer – 
presumably lowering the risk of getting caught by authorities.  Function parameters 
are calibrated by minimizing the sum of squared differences between   ( ) and 
  ( ):  
 
       e
      
∑(   
  
      
 
  )
 
 
   
 (3A.3) 
 
Time-series data on rhino poaching in South Africa’s national parks,   , are listed in 
Table 3A.1   (Knight & Emslie, 2012; Milliken & Shaw, 2012).  Data on GDP of 
China and Vietnam,   , and civil unrest in Assam,   , are listed in Table 3.1.  
These data are used in a non-linear solver to yield the calibrated values as per 
(3A.3):    1.04418,    2.03751,    4.58e-08,    0.05082.  These values are 
used to derive the market price index for rhino horn as:      (  )     
 
 by using 
Equation (3A.2).   
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Table 3A.1: Data on rhino poaching in South Africa,   , as an instrument for horn 
price index,     
 
Year Rhino poaching in South 
Africa,    
Estimated Price index, 
      
 
 
1990 14 0.5240481540 
1991 5 0.4973286495 
1992 18 0.5307850539 
1993 14 0.5240481540 
1994 27 0.5418372794 
1995 14 0.5240481540 
1996 6 0.5019587467 
1997 6 0.5019587467 
1998 12 0.5199582682 
1999 13 0.5220779407 
2000 12 0.5199582682 
2001 9 0.5124107389 
2002 25 0.5397219137 
2003 22 0.5362264970 
2004 12 0.5199582682 
2005 17 0.5292452588 
2006 36 0.5498182454 
2007 13 0.5220779407 
2008 83 0.5736644738 
2009 122 0.5850060943 
2010 333 0.6156377863 
2011 448 0.6249906309 
2012 455 0.6254833376 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
ORGANIZED CRIMES AGAINST NATURE:  
ELEPHANTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA  
 
   
4.1   Background and Overview 
In early 1981, the elephant population in Africa was estimated at 1.2 million animals.  
There are two subspecies of elephant on the African continent; the forest elephant 
(Loxodonta cyclotis), predominantly found in the forested areas of Central Africa, and 
the savanna elephant (Loxodonta africana), found primarily in Eastern and Southern 
Africa.  During the 1980s an estimated 675,000 elephants were poached and by 1989 
the elephant population had declined to just over 600,000 animals  (Barbier, Burgess, 
Swanson, & Pearce, 1990).  In 1989 the African elephant was listed as an Appendix I 
(endangered) species by the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
(CITES) and a ban was placed on the trade of elephant products.  Recent estimates 
place the total elephant population in African range states at 423,000 in the year 2012 
(IUCN, 2012).   
There is considerable evidence to suggest that the poaching of elephant tusk 
and rhino horn in Africa is planned and financed by international syndicates using 
organized crime as a business model.  These syndicates sponsor poaching gangs with 
aircraft and high-powered weapons, and also arrange for rapid shipment of tusk and 
horn to markets in Asia  (Mullen & Zhang, 2012; Sas-Rolfes, 2012; Shukman, 2013; 
Wassener, 2013; S. K. Wasser et al., 2008). Based on data from seizures of illegal 
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ivory shipments amounting to roughly 24 tons in the year 2006 Wasser et. al. (2007) 
use DNA analysis to estimate that  approximately 23,000 savannah elephants were 
illegally harvested from the southern African range states.  In June 2002 authorities in 
Malawi seized a shipment of 6.5 tons of ivory that was bound for Hong Kong; (S. K. 
Wasser et al., 2008) estimate that approximately 6,500 elephants were illegally 
harvested for that shipment alone.  Based on the evidence from the ivory seizures (S. 
K. Wasser et al., 2008) suggest that at least two syndicates were associated with 
poaching at the time in different regions of the African range states.   
The change in elephant populations has varied widely by country.  
Government corruption and the number of armed anti-poaching patrols have been 
considered important variables when explaining country-level changes in elephant 
populations.  Balmford et al. (2003) use ordinary least squares to regress the change in 
elephant populations in 20 African countries on a subjective index of corruption.  
They show that a higher index of corruption had a significant negative effect on the 
change in a country's elephant population between 1987 and 1994.   Frank & Maurseth 
(2006) find that there are significant “neighborhood effects” that may reduce the size 
of the coefficient on corruption.  Corruption still causes a significant negative effect, 
but neighborhood effects may also influence the change in a country’s elephant 
population.  Neighborhood effects account for the migration of elephants between 
countries, and the presence or lack of poaching in a neighboring country.  
In a provocative article Messer (2010) plots the estimated elephant populations 
in Kenya and Zimbabwe after those countries adopted a “shoot-on-sight” policy when 
dealing with poachers going after elephant ivory or rhino horn.  For the period 1984 
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through 2002, elephant populations increased in countries that adopted the shoot-on-
sight policy, and declined in countries that did not.  The decline of elephant 
populations in countries not adopting a shoot-on-sight policy continued even after 
1989, when CITES listed Loxodonta africana in Appendix I.  Messer contends that 
low wages in developing countries impose limits on the potential economic costs for 
poachers of fines and imprisonment.  
In a model where elephant ivory is a storable commodity Kremer & Morcom 
(2000) show that rational expectations may lead to multiple equilibria in a dynamic 
open-access model.  There could be equilibria where elephant are driven to extinction.  
In their model, the cheapest way for a government to eliminate extinction equilibria 
may be to commit to tough anti-poaching measures if the population falls below some 
threshold.  For governments without a credible anti-poaching threat, the cheapest way 
to eliminate extinction equilibria may be to accumulate a sufficient stockpile of ivory 
and threaten to sell it should the elephant population fall below some threshold.  Their 
analysis assumes that the black-market price would fall when a government sells a 
large amount of stockpiled ivory.   
While strategic selling of accumulated stockpiles of ivory might seem rational 
to economists, it has been opposed by many African leaders and conservation 
organizations.  On July 18
th
 1989, then President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya ignited 
twelve tons of ivory, much of it confiscated from poachers, as a gesture in support of 
the Appendix I listing of Loxodonta africana by CITES (Perlez, 1989).  In 1997, 
CITES voted to down-list elephant populations in Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe 
to Appendix II (Burton, 1999).  Down-listing to Appendix II allows these countries to 
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engage in a tightly monitored sale of stockpiled ivory.  In 2010 a similar request by 
Tanzania and Zambia was denied (IUCN, 2013).  These two countries had 
accumulated approximately one hundred and twelve tons of ivory.  The majority of 
CITES members, and most conservation groups opposed the change to Appendix II 
for Tanzania and Zambia on the grounds that it would “flood the ivory market,” 
increase the use ivory, and make the detection of illegally poached ivory more 
difficult.  The effectiveness of the CITES ban in the recovery of elephant populations 
has been questioned by several other studies, including  (Barbier et al., 1990; E. Bulte 
& Van Kooten, 1996; Kreuter & Simmons, 1995; Sugg & Kreuter, 1994).  For the 
CITES ban to be effective it would have to stigmatize the trade and use of ivory so 
that demand and the black-market price fall (Burton, 1999).  The lack of time-series 
data on black-market prices and the volume of ivory traded make it impossible to 
develop accurate estimates of the price flexibility of ivory.  Burton (1999) is skeptical 
that either the stigma created by the CITES ban or the sale of government stockpiled 
ivory would lower the black-market price sufficiently to reduce poaching.  According 
to Burton’s open-access simulations, the price of ivory on the black market would 
have to fall by ninety percent for elephant populations to increase under open-access 
equilibrium.  The model in this chapter identifies why the sale of stockpiled ivory may 
not reduce poaching.   
The incentive to poach has been studied under various conservation policies 
including trade bans  (E. H. Bulte & van Kooten, 1999a; E. H. Bulte & van Kooten, 
1999b; Burton, 1999), fines for poaching  (E. H. Bulte & van Kooten, 1999a; E. H. 
Bulte & van Kooten, 1999b; Damania, Milner-Gulland, & Crookes, 2005; Damania, 
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Stringer, Karanth, & Stith, 2003; Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams, 1992; Skonhoft 
& Solstad, 1998), alternative livelihoods when there is conflict between land use and 
species conservation  (Fischer, Muchapondwa, & Sterner, 2011; A. Johannesen & 
Skonhoft, 2005; Skonhoft, 2007), and price-control through supply restrictions 
(Brown & Layton, 2001; Kremer & Morcom, 2000; Mason C.F., Bulte E.H., & Horan 
R.D., 2012).  Models of poaching assume open access harvest conditions where, with 
imperfect property rights, poachers myopically maximize short-run profit, and 
entry/exit occurs until rents are dissipated.  Economic models of poaching predict how 
the steady-state equilibrium stock, harvest, and enforcement levels change with 
economic parameters such as price, poaching cost, and detection probability  (E. H. 
Bulte & van Kooten, 1999b; A. Johannesen & Skonhoft, 2005; A. B. Johannesen & 
Skonhoft, 2004; Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams, 1992; Skonhoft & Solstad, 
1998).  In linking economics and ecological theory (E. Bulte, Damania, Gillson, & 
Lindsay, 2004; Skonhoft, 2007) have noted that models should expand their scope 
beyond the notion of steady state equilibrium by incorporating uncertainty, ecological 
variability, complexity, scale.   
In this chapter I introduce uncertainty through stochastic poaching, and study 
its effects on elephant population dynamics.  In the next section I construct a biomass 
(lumped-parameter) model of the elephant population in Southern African range 
states.  In section 4.3 I focus on the optimization problem for the leader of a poaching 
organization (gang).  I identify the plausible conditions under which the number of 
planned poaching expeditions will be insensitive to the black-market price of ivory.  I 
also identify a critical value for the annual number of poaching expeditions.  If this 
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number is consistently exceeded, the elephant population will slowly decline to 
extinction.  Section 4.4 reports on the stochastic implications of poaching by more 
than one gang with free entry/exit under open access until profits are driven to zero.  I 
also conduct a sensitivity analysis of our results by changing the values of economic 
parameters including the probability of interception by an anti-poaching patrol, the 
cost of poaching expeditions, and the black market price of ivory.  Section 4.5 
concludes.  
 
4.2   An Aggregate Model of Elephant Poaching in Southern Africa 
Let    denote the number of elephants in the population in Southern Africa and    the 
number killed by poaching organizations, both in year  .  The dynamics of the 
elephant population will be described by the iterative map (4.1):  
 
     (   )    (  )     (4.1) 
 
      is an average annual mortality rate, and  (  ) is a purely 
compensatory growth function.  An age-structured model, or a model with delayed 
recruitment to an adult population might be more appropriate, but this biomass 
(lumped-parameter) model has been used in previous studies  (E. H. Bulte & van 
Kooten, 1999b; Cromsigt, Hearne, Heitkonig, & Prins, 2002; Milner-Gulland & 
Leader-Williams, 1992), and has the advantage of providing analytic benchmarks for 
stochastic poaching.   
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The number of elephant killed by poachers in any year is determined in part by 
the number of poaching expeditions planned by the leaders of the various poaching 
gangs.  In deciding the likely number of poaching expeditions, a leader must balance 
expected net revenue with the probability that members of a unit might be captured, 
plea-bargain, and provide information leading to the destruction of the organization.  
The details of this optimization problem will be presented in the next section.  For 
now, I simply note that if poachers are intercepted by an anti-poaching unit, our model 
assumes that the organization is “decommissioned” for the rest of the year.  Early 
detection and dismantling of the poaching organization will reduce the number of 
elephant killed in that year.  However, I assume that poaching can never be eliminated 
entirely, and that a new poaching organization reappears at the start of the next year, 
with a new leader who again optimizes the number of planned poaching expeditions.  
At the start of year   the organization leader gathers information on the size of 
the elephant herd as well as the number of anti-poaching units.  Let    denote the 
average value of two ivory tusks from a single elephant when sold on the black 
market.  The kill rate of a poaching unit for a single expedition is assumed 
proportional to the elephant population and is given by     , where        is an 
efficiency parameter for hunters in a poaching expeditions deployed in year  .  The 
value of    has likely increased in the last decade given reports  (Mullen & Zhang, 
2012; Shukman, 2013; Wassener, 2013; S. K. Wasser et al., 2008) of poaching 
organizations using high-tech equipment like aircraft, darting guns, and knock-down 
drugs for their operations.  
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To make the biomass model more concrete, I specify a form for the growth 
function in Equation (4.1) and calibrate its parameters.  Following  (Milner-Gulland & 
Leader-Williams, 1992) I adopt a skewed logistic where  (  )     [  (   ⁄ )
 ].  
Because the average survival rate of the elephant population is given by (   ), I 
treat     as the pregnancy rate of adult females giving birth to approximately one 
offspring every third year.  This implies       .  The average mortality rate varies 
across countries and depends on the abundance of water and forage.  Under normal 
years, the average mortality rate (including juveniles) has been estimated at         
(Armbruster & Lande, 1993).  These values would imply a net intrinsic growth rate of   
(   )      , a value very close to the estimate used by (Calef, 1988).  A skew 
parameter greater than one (   ) will cause the population level supporting peak 
growth to lie to the right of   ⁄ .   (Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams, 1992)set 
   .  With mortality occurring after growth, the parameter     will influence the 
steady-state elephant population in the absence of poaching, but it should not be 
interpreted as environmental carrying capacity.   
The no-poaching, steady-state population can be shown to equal   
 [(   )  ⁄ ]
 
 ⁄ .  This steady-state population will be locally stable provided 
|   (   )|      If           elephants for all of Southern Africa,       , 
      , and    , the no-poaching, steady-state elephant population is calculated 
to be            this value is locally stable since |   (   )|        .  
According to (Blanc, 2007), the combined elephant population in the Southern African 
range states (i.e. Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, 
and Zimbabwe as shown in Figure 4.1) in 2006 was approximately 297,718.  If this 
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number represented the steady-state elephant population with poaching (   
       ) then   [     (   ⁄ )
 ]          would be the steady-state 
number of elephants killed by poachers.  In reality, the elephant population in 
Southern Africa will never be in steady state because of stochastic poaching and 
droughts.  However these "counterfactual" steady-state values,           , and 
          are useful because they give us a benchmark from which to assess the 
consequences of organized, stochastic, criminal poaching.  As mentioned earlier in 
this chapter Wasser et. al. (2007) estimated that  approximately 23,000 savannah 
elephants were illegally harvested from the Southern African range states in the year 
2006. These results are summarized in Table 4.1.  
 
 
Figure 4.1: Southern African elephant range states.  
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Table 4.1: Population dynamics, biological parameters, steady-state, and stability.  
Parameter  Value 
Intrinsic growth rate    0.33  (Armbruster & Lande, 1993) 
Natural mortality rate    0.27  (Armbruster & Lande, 1993) 
Logistic growth skew 
parameter  
   7  (Bulte & van Kooten, 1999b; Milner-Gulland & 
Leader-Williams, 1992) 
Initial elephant 
population in 2006 
    297,718 in the Southern African range states (Blanc, 
2007) 
Carrying capacity    500,000 
 
Iterative map (4.1):      (   )      [  (   ⁄ )
 ]     
Steady-state elephant population with no poaching (    ):    [(   )  ⁄ ]
 
 ⁄  
        
 
Elephant population in Southern African range states in 2006:            (i.e. steady-state 
elephant population with deterministic poaching) 
Steady-state elephant population killed by poachers:   [     (   ⁄ )
 ]          
 
Approximately 23,000 savannah elephants illegally harvested in Southern African range states 
in 2006 (Wasser et. al. 2007).  
 
 
4.3   Optimal Poaching 
Let us now develop the optimization problem for the leader of a poaching organization 
and show how it leads to a target number of planned poaching expeditions.  Let 
     denote the number of anti-poaching units that the leader of a poaching 
organization thinks will be deployed in year  .  Let     (  ) be the subjective, 
Bernoulli probability, held by the leader of the poaching organization, that any single 
poaching expedition will be intercepted by a government anti-poaching unit. Let us 
assume that     (  ) is identical and independent for all poaching expeditions in a 
given year.
4
  
                                                 
4 It would be possible to allow the probability of interception by an anti-poaching unit to increase with 
each completed (i.e. successful) poaching expedition.  One would then need a model of how the 
conditional probability of success for the next poaching expedition depends on the fact that all previous 
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 Let      denote the cost of deploying a single poaching expedition in year  .  
This would be the cost of gasoline, food, ammunition, and other supplies.  The 
poaching unit is comprised of hunters, carriers, drivers, and perhaps pilots. Assume 
that these individuals collectively receive the net revenue from a poaching expedition, 
provided that it has not been intercepted by an anti-poaching unit.  At the beginning of 
each year the gang leader determines the number of planned poaching expeditions,   
 , 
a non-negative integer,
 
as per Equation (4.2):
5
    
 
  
        
   {      }
{(   (  ))
  
          } (4.2) 
 
One can think of the poaching expeditions as being sent out sequentially 
during a given year.  If the gang leader sets a target of   
  expeditions in year  , then 
(   (  ))
  
 
 would be the probability that none of the expeditions will be 
intercepted by an anti-poaching unit.  The actual number of poaching expeditions 
“successfully” completed in year   will be less than or equal to   
 .  The number of 
elephants killed by poaching units in year   is thereby a random variable given by 
                                                                                                                                            
poaching expeditions were successful. 
5 The non-linear nature of equation (4.2) does not permit the derivation of an analytical expression for 
  
 .  The optimal number of planned expeditions   
  can be numerically solved for a positive integer 
value.  The first-order condition of the maximization process is implicit in a numerical solution of the 
optimal number of planned poaching expeditions,   
 , in time period  . 
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         , where      
  is the “realized” number of successful poaching 
expeditions in year  .   
The gang leader’s decision-making process can be summarized with the help 
of the schematic in Figure 4.2.  At the beginning of time period   the gang leader 
forms an assessment of the elephant population (  ).  Given the parameters of black-
market price ( ), probability of interception ( (  )), cost per expedition ( ) and the 
poaching technology or catchability coefficient ( ), the leader maximizes the expected 
profit expression, Equation (4.2), by numerically solving for the optimal number of 
planned poaching expeditions (  
 ).  With a given probability of interception ( (  )), 
one can simulate for a resulting number of realized poaching expeditions, denoted by 
   [    
 ].  The elephant population in the next time period,    , will evolve as per 
the iterative map (4.1), after a realization of poaching/harvest,          , in time 
period  . 
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Figure 4.2: Poaching gang leader’s decision process of planned expeditions (  
 ). 
 
Having laid out the theoretical optimization process, I now turn to numerical 
simulations using parameter values from the literature.  (Milner-Gulland & Leader-
Williams, 1992) estimated an average “detection rate” for poaching expeditions in 
Zambia for the period 1980 to 1983 to be  ( )      .  It is difficult to determine 
whether this probability is appropriate for our model of organized poaching circa 
2013.  Assuming that the investment in the number of anti-poaching units in the 
Southern Africa range states has significantly increased since the early 1980s I set a 
base-case probability of  (  )      .  However, the use of high-tech equipment by 
poaching organizations might also result in a lower probability of detection by anti-
Population (𝑋𝑡) Ivory price (𝑃), expedition cost (𝑐), catchability (𝑞) 
Equation (4.2): 𝑛𝑡
        𝑛𝑡 {      }{(  𝜋(𝑎𝑡))
𝑛𝑡
𝑃𝑞𝑋𝑡𝑛𝑡  𝑐𝑛𝑡} 
Planned expeditions (𝑛𝑡
 ) 
Realized expeditions (𝑛𝑡  𝑛𝑡
 ) 
Iterative map (4.1): 𝑋𝑡   (  𝑚)𝑋𝑡  𝑟𝑋𝑡(  (𝑋𝑡 𝐾⁄ )
𝑧)  𝑛𝑡𝑞𝑋𝑡 
Interception probability 𝜋(𝑎𝑡) 
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poaching patrols.  In the next section the dynamic consequences of more sophisticated, 
high-tech poaching with lower probabilities of detection will be examined.  
The black-market price for two ivory tusks, weighing twenty kilograms, may 
be as high as           (Messer, 2010).  The cost of outfitting a single poaching 
expedition will be set at          .  The efficiency of a poaching unit, as measured 
by   , was estimated by  (Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams, 1992) to be      
     for organized gangs in Zambia in 1985.  Given the technology available today I 
multiply this efficiency parameter by a factor of ten and set           
  .   
If             and   
(  )      , then   
           {      }{(  
 (  ))
  
          }   .  If  (  )      ,   
           {      }{(  
 (  ))
  
          }    .  
With  (  )      ,   
   .  If all 9 expeditions were completed without 
interception by an anti-poaching unit, net revenue accruing to “management” of the 
poaching organization would be  $7,158,998 from the killing of 6,859 elephants.  With 
 (  )      ,   
    .  If all 19 expeditions were completed without interception, a 
single poaching organization would kill 14,481 elephants for a profit of $14,719,839.  
These results are summarized in Table 4.2.   
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Table 4.2: Economic parameters and optimal poaching when  (  )       and      
Parameter  Value 
Black market ivory price     $3,000 per set of two tusks (Messer, 2010) 
Harvest efficiency               (Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams, 1992) 
Detection probability  (  )= 0.10; 0.05  (Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams, 1992) 
Expedition cost    $2,000  
For           :  
If  (  )      , then   
           {      }{(   (  ))
  
          }    
Expected net revenue of poaching gang = $7,158,998 from harvest of 6,859 elephants.  
 
If  (  )      , then   
           {      }{(   (  ))
  
          }     
Expected net revenue of poaching gang = $14,719,839 from harvest of 14,481 elephants.  
 
 
While Equation (4.2) would imply that  (  ),   ,   ,   , and    would all play 
a roll in determining   
 , the sensitivity of   
  to these parameters is not uniform.  In 
fact, Equation (4.2) has an interesting property. 
 
Proposition:  If {(   (  ))
  
          }    and   (    )⁄    but 
sufficiently small, then   
  only depends on  (  )   
 
Proof:  Define the expected net revenue from    planned poaching expeditions as 
 [   ]  {(   (  ))
  
          }.  Divide both sides by        so that 
 [   ] [    ]  (   (  ))
  
   [  (    )⁄ ]  ⁄ .  Then, if   (    )⁄   , the 
integer value of    which maximizes  [   ]  {(   (  ))
  
          } is the 
integer that maximizes (   (  ))
  
   and   
  only depends on  (  ).  
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For the parameter values in Table 4.2,   (    )⁄          , which is 
sufficiently small so that changes in   ,   ,   , and    may not change   
 .  
Specifically, a drop in    from $3,000 to $1,000 will not change the optimal number of 
planned poaching expeditions.  If  (  )       and    falls from            to 
         , poaching still generates a positive profit and the number of planned 
poaching expeditions remains at   
    .  The relative insensitivity of   
  to changes 
in the black-market price of ivory or to the elephant population will have important 
implications for system dynamics and anti-poaching policy. 
With poaching the dynamics of the elephant population are determined by:   
 
     (   )      (  (   ⁄ )
 )        (4.3) 
 
Insight can be gleaned on the behavior of elephant population with stochastic 
poaching from the deterministic case where     , and     is a constant.  Equation 
(4.3) can be solved for a steady state at    [(      )  ⁄ ]      
(provided         ).  This steady state locally stable if and only if |  
 (      )|   .  If   (   )  ⁄ , we would have    , and the elephant 
population will ultimately become extinct as a result of poaching.  With stochastic 
poaching, if    is frequently above    (   )  ⁄ , the population may go to 
extinction as    ; this may however take a long time to occur.  For       , 
      , and             we calculate           .  Because I restrict the 
realized number of poaching expedition to be a non-negative integer, if       is 
frequently above   , the elephant population will ultimately go extinct.  In Figure 4.3 I 
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show the elephant population starting from            when          , 
      ,       ,            ,    , and    {    } with equal 
probability,   (    )    (     )     , ultimately goes extinct over 500-time 
periods.  In this case the expected value for    is 25, which exceeds           . 
 
 
Figure 4.3.  A single realization depicting extinction of elephant population with 
 [  ]   25, which exceeds the critical value,    (   )  ⁄         .  Time 
period shown on the horizontal axis, and elephant population shown on the vertical 
axis.   
 
I now examine the dynamics of the elephant population in Southern Africa 
with multiple poaching gangs where under open access conditions there is free 
entry/exit until profits are driven to zero.  I examine the dynamics of elephant 
population and the economic choices of the poaching organizations when the 
probability of interception/detection by an anti-poaching unit on any particular 
expedition is initially set at the base-case value of  (  )      .  I also examine the 
dynamics of elephant population and economic choices when, because of more 
evasive, high-tech poaching, the probability of interception assumes lower values.  
0
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4.4   The Elephant Population with Multiple Poaching Organizations  
Recall that at the start of each year, the leader determines   
 , the optimal number of 
planned expeditions.  The number of elephant killed in year   becomes the realization 
        , where        
  is a random variable.  I consider now the possibility 
of additional poaching gangs operating independently in the Southern African range 
states.  Each gang to carry out the same maximization process, as determined by 
equation (4.2).  I examine the possibility of multiple gangs under the open access 
conditions of myopic poaching, and free entry/exit until profits are driven to zero for 
the poaching industry.  Accordingly, each gang leader chooses his/her own optimal 
planned number of expeditions    
 , where   denotes the gang.  Expeditions are sent 
out by each gang leader independently and sequentially.  The probability of 
interception of any expedition of any gang remains  (  ).  In this event the total 
realization of harvest or poached elephants will be the sum ∑    (        )
 
   , 
where   is the total number of operating gangs in time period  .  This sum is 
subtracted from the growth of elephant population as per the modified iterative map 
(4.4):  
 
     (   )      (  (   ⁄ )
 )  ∑       
 
     (4.4) 
 
Numerical simulations are carried out for time periods             
according to Equations (4.2) and (4.4).  I report the relevant economic and population 
statistics of the simulation exercises for one, two and three operating gangs.  In 
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addition I determine the number of poaching gangs that would operate under open 
access conditions when the elephant population settles into a low-population-level 
steady state, or goes to extinction, and it is no longer profitable for more gangs to 
operate.  The simulated elephant population of the first 100 years is disregarded to 
eliminate the influence of the initial condition,           .  Each of the one 
thousand time period simulations are iterated one thousand times and the average 
number of realized poaching expeditions is calculated as   ̅̅̅  (      )∑     
     
    
for            .  Also calculated is the average elephant population in year  , that 
is   ̅̅ ̅  (      )∑     
     
    for            .  These averages are plotted in 
Figures 4.4 through 4.9.  
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Distribution of realized number of trips:  
  ̅̅̅  (      )∑     
     
     
for             . 
 
Mean = 5.5179 
Variance = 0.1181 
Minimum Value = 4.18 
Maximum Value = 6.63 
Distribution of realized population: 
  ̅̅ ̅  (      )∑     
     
      
for             . 
 
Mean = 376,975 
Variance = 205,145 
Minimum Value = 375,790 
Maximum Value = 378,522 
  
Figure 4.4: Summary statistics for one poaching gang;  (  )      ,   
    
 
Over the one thousand iterations of the one thousand year realization time 
period I find that for the one poaching gang, with  (  )       and   
   , the mean 
number of realized poaching expeditions is 5.51 with a variance of 0.118.  The 
elephant population, for the interval            ,  is centered at a mean of 
376,975 with a variance of 205,145.  None of the one thousand iterations resulted in 
elephant population extinction.   
The corresponding descriptive statistics and distributions with two poaching 
gangs are shown in Figure 4.5.  I note that the mean and variance of the number of 
realized poaching expeditions approximately double while the average elephant 
population declines to 357,384.  The variance of the elephant population more that 
doubles to 451,586.  The planned poaching expeditions remains at   
   9, and the 
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average number of realized expeditions increases to 11.  Similar to the case with one 
gang none of the 1,000 simulations resulted in extinction.  
 
Distribution of realized number of trips:  
  ̅̅̅  (      )∑     
     
     
for            . 
 
Mean = 11.014 
Variance = 0.2383 
Minimum Value = 9.43 
Maximum Value = 12.39 
Distribution of realized population: 
  ̅̅ ̅  (      )∑     
     
      
for            . 
 
Mean = 357,384 
Variance = 451,586 
Minimum Value = 355,413 
Maximum Value = 359,969 
  
 
Figure 4.5: Summary statistics for two poaching gangs;  (  )      ,   
    
 
The results with three poaching gangs are shown in Figure 4.6.  The 
distribution of poaching expeditions shifts to the right (it is now centered at a mean of 
16.53 realized expeditions).  The elephant population shifts downward to a time series 
with a mean of 327,857 a variance of 1,025,570.  With the detection probability set at 
its base-case value of  (  )      , the qualitative behavior of the system remains 
similar for one, two, and three gangs; each gang attempts   
    planned poaching 
expeditions over the one thousand year time horizon.  With three poaching gangs 
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operating the average number of realized expeditions increases to 16.53.  I note that 
this is lower than the critical value of expeditions,           .  This provides 
insight into why the elephant population does not result in extinction for any of the 
simulations with the base-case parameter values. 
 
Distribution of realized number of trips:  
  ̅̅̅  (      )∑     
     
     
for             . 
 
Mean = 16.53 
Variance = 0.3466  
Minimum Value = 14.50 
Maximum Value = 18.49 
Distribution of realized population:  
  ̅̅ ̅  (
 
    
)∑     
     
     
for             . 
 
Mean = 327,857 
Variance = 1,025,570 
Minimum Value = 324,805 
Maximum Value = 331,049 
  
Figure 4.6: Summary statistics for three poaching gangs;  (  )      ,   
    
 
I now examine how the dynamics of elephant population and the poaching 
organizations’ economic decision-making change as a result of more high-tech 
poaching.  More high-tech poaching is represented by a lower probability of detection 
given the use of modern equipment by the poaching gangs.  One can also argue that 
more high-tech poaching would increase the cost of poaching expeditions from the 
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base-case value listed in Table 4.2.  In this chapter I examine this in a sensitivity 
analysis of the results where the economic parameters are varied.   
Reducing the interception probability to  (  )       causes the optimal 
number of planned poaching expeditions to increase to   
     as noted in Table 4.2.  
As more poaching gangs participate in the illegal business of elephant poaching, the 
frequency with which       increases, and so does the likelihood that the 
population is driven to extinction.  In Figure 4.7 I show the distributions of average 
realized poaching expeditions and average elephant populations with just one 
poaching gang.  The annual average of the realized number of poaching expeditions is 
11.79, which is below the critical value,     23.4375.  Thus here again I note that the 
elephant population does not decline to extinction, and attains a stationary distribution 
much like the previous three cases.  The average elephant population fluctuates around 
a mean of 353,456 with a variance of 1,057,366.     
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Distribution of realized number of trips:  
  ̅̅̅  (      )∑     
     
     
for             . 
 
Mean = 11.79 
Variance = 0.501  
Minimum Value = 9.66 
Maximum Value = 13.88 
Distribution of realized population: 
  ̅̅ ̅  (      )∑     
     
      
for             . 
 
Mean = 353,456 
Variance = 1,057,366 
Minimum Value = 350,782 
Maximum Value = 356,553 
  
Figure 4.7: Summary statistics for one poaching gang;  (  )      ,   
     
 
An interesting mathematical phenomenon occurs when one considers the 
addition of a second poaching gang when  (  )      .  The results are shown in 
Figure 4.8 where a stochastic bifurcation seems to occur causing a change in the 
stochastic behavior of the resource system.  One way to analyze a stochastic 
bifurcation is through the statistical analysis of the time to cross a critical value for the 
state variable (Diks and Wagener, 2006).  I assume a critical value for the state 
variable (elephant population) of     150,000.  Then I examine the number of 
simulations (realizations) out of 1,000 where the elephant population drops below 
    150,000, and the median time to drop below     150,000.  Figure 4.8 is one 
such realization out of 1,000.  In this realization the elephant population undergoes a 
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steep decline but appears to stabilize at a new stationary distribution for 500     
1,000 centered at a mean of 105,067 with a standard deviation of 15,359.  Due to the 
insensitivity of   
 , the optimal number of planned poaching expeditions remains at 19 
for both gangs.  
A more detailed analysis of the crossing statistics reveals that the median time 
for the elephant population to drop below     150,000 is   (  )     
          
three out of the one thousand stochastic simulations remained above     150,000 for 
500     1,000.  In contrast, when  (  )   0.10 none of the stochastic simulations, 
with one, two, or three poaching gangs, caused the elephant population to drop below 
    150,000.  This was also true for  (  )   0.05 when there was only one poaching 
gang (see Figure 4.7).   
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Harvest:  
 
Mean = 9,926 
St. Dev. = 5,954 
Minimum Value = 0  
Maximum Value = 28,367 
Elephant population: 
 
Mean = 166,013 
St. Dev. = 65,602  
Minimum Value = 78,600  
Maximum Value = 303,163 
  
  
Figure 4.8: Harvest and elephant population with two poaching gangs (single 
simulation;  (  )      ).  
 
To continue our line of analysis adopted for the previous cases, we plot the 
average of 1,000 simulations for the case of two gangs operating under  (  )      .  
One sees a mean average for realized poaching expeditions increase to 23.63, which is 
higher than the critical value,           .  The variance of the average elephant 
population is split into two parts:  432,267,466 for   = 100 to 500, and 121,045,740 for 
  = 501 to 1000.  The results are shown in Figure 4.9.  This difference in the variance 
for the two time periods shows that the initial decline is steeper than the latter.  The 
frequency with which       is such that the elephant population exhibits a slow 
decline toward extinction although none of the 1,000 realization resulted in extinction 
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before    1,000.  The stochastic nature of realized poaching expeditions, where in 
some years      , can significantly slow the descent toward extinction.  In years 
where       the elephant population may increase in the following year.  The 
average harvest of the two poaching organizations combined is estimated to be 8,896 
elephants over the 1,000 year time horizon.  A maximum average harvest of 23,932 
occurs at the starting period in the simulations, which corresponds to the year 2006.  I 
note that this average maximum realized harvest of 23,932 is close to the estimated 
23,000 elephants killed in the empirical study of Wasser et. al. (2007).   
 
Distribution of realized number of trips:  
  ̅̅̅  (      )∑     
     
     
for             . 
 
Mean = 23.63 
Variance = 1.039 
Minimum Value = 20.36 
Maximum Value = 27.24 
Distribution of realized population: 
  ̅̅ ̅  (      )∑     
     
      
for             . 
 
Mean = 131,872 
Variance (  = 100 to 500) = 432,267,466  
Variance (  = 501 to 1000) = 121,045,740 
Minimum Value = 88,922 
Maximum Value = 208,919 
  
Figure 4.9: Summary statistics for two poaching gangs;  (  )      ,   
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When the number of poaching gangs increases to three, the descent to low 
population levels is much more rapid.  Here too I note the occurrence of a stochastic 
bifurcation.  The median crossing time occurs sooner when there are three gangs as 
opposed to two gangs, given a probability of detection and interception of 
 (  )  
  (  )     
            182, and the elephant population dropped below the chosen critical 
value of    150,000 in all simulations. 
In Figure 4.10 most of realized poaching expeditions are above            
with a maximum annual average of   ̅̅̅   39.26.  The elephant population goes into an 
immediate and steep decline and by period    200, the population has declined below 
14,000 elephants and the three poaching gangs have reduced their number of planned 
poaching expeditions to between   
   10 and 12.  This alters the dynamics of the 
elephant population.  A reduction in the planned poaching expeditions by all three 
gangs may stabilize the population at a low steady-state level of 1,497 after    150.  
The variance of the average elephant population for the years    100 to 150 is 
7,664,541, while for the years    151 to 1,000 the variance is much lower at 130,024.  
The average harvest level with three poaching organizations is estimated to be 897 
elephants over the time period   151 to 1,000.  The maximum average harvest was 
estimated to be 26,806 elephants at the beginning time period of these simulations.  
This is higher than the corresponding 23,932 elephants killed under the previous case 
of two gangs, each facing  (  )   0.05.  
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Distribution of realized number of trips:  
  ̅̅̅  (      )∑     
     
     
for             . 
 
Mean = 25.54 
Variance = 17.14 
Minimum Value = 21.46 
Maximum Value = 39.26 
Distribution of realized population: 
  ̅̅ ̅  (      )∑     
     
      
for             . 
 
Mean = 1,497 
Variance (  = 100 to 150) = 7,664,541 
Variance (  = 151 to 1000) = 130,024 
Minimum Value = 1,001 
Maximum Value = 13,540 
  
Figure 4.10: Summary statistics for three poaching gangs;  (  )      ,   
      
 
Given the dramatic changes in system dynamics with additional gangs in 
operation under different levels of detection and interception probability, I summarize 
the qualitative dynamic behavior of the above six cases in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3: Stochastic Behavior of the Elephant Population with One, Two, and Three 
Poaching Gangs when  (  )   0.10 and  (  )   0.05 
 One Gang Two Gangs Three Gangs 
 (  )   0.10 Stationary 
distribution 
Stationary 
distribution 
Stationary 
distribution 
 (  )   0.05 Stationary 
distribution 
Apparent stochastic 
bifurcation 
Stochastic 
bifurcation 
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One can potentially determine the number of poaching organizations that 
might operate under “open access” conditions with our base-case set of model 
parameter values.  Despite the small population levels with three gangs in operation, 
poaching is still profitable with median net revenue of $26,295 per year.  With the lure 
of profits additional organizations may enter the illegal business of elephant poaching 
in the Southern African range states.  This would occur until it is no longer profitable 
for additional organizations to operate, or the elephant population goes extinct.  It was 
noted in Figure 4.10 that the minimum population was 1,001 over the time period    
151 to 1,000.  There might still exist economic incentive for additional poaching 
organizations to enter the illicit poaching market.  This might happen even though the 
elephant population settles into a low steady state value.  Poaching gangs might target 
smaller sub-populations of elephant, and this would potentially lead to extinction.   
In Table 4.4 I report the average statistics from simulation exercises with an 
increase in the number of poaching gangs in operation to ten, fifteen, and twenty 
gangs.  This is done for the two values of the probability of detection,  (  )   5% and 
10%.  I note that extinction of the elephant population in the Southern African range 
states occurs in each of the scenarios considered.  The number of planned poaching 
trips/expeditions drops down to 3, 2, and 1 when the number of gangs increases to 10, 
15, and 20.  However in the beginning time periods of the simulation when the 
population is high the total harvest increases to as much as 166,226 by 20 gangs.  As a 
result of high harvest levels initially, the total harvest by these poaching gangs 
eventually declines to 14 for 20 gangs under    5%.  The total number of realized 
poaching trips/expeditions declines to little as 17, which implies that for 20 gangs the 
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average is less than 1 poaching expedition per year.  With the possibility of elephant 
populations settling into low levels, it may be unviable to support high-tech, organized 
poaching, and there might be an evolution back to small-scale, local, low-tech, gangs 
operating under open access conditions.  
 
 
Table 4.4: Elephant extinction under open access in the Southern African range states 
 10 gangs 15 gangs 20 gangs 
    5%    10%    5%    10%    5%    10% 
Population (median) 363 680 324 417 318 405 
Total Harvest (minimum) 18 33 14 20 14 17 
Total Harvest (median) 21 41 19 25 19 24 
Total Harvest (maximum) 92,144 43,519 131,396 65,164 166,226 90,468 
Total Poaching trips 
(minimum) 22 21 18 20 18 17 
Total Poaching trips 
(median) 26 26 25 25 24 24 
Total Poaching trips 
(maximum) 131 61 184 90 243 118 
Profit minimum (per gang) 984 5,097 406 1,024 315 847 
   3 3 2 2 1 1 
Elephant extinction Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
 Lastly, in Table 4.5 I consider changing the economic parameter values in our 
model to analyze how they affect the key results of this chapter.  The economic 
parameters include the black market ivory price,  , the cost per poaching expedition, 
 , and the catchability coefficient,  .  The sensitivity analysis is conducted for a single 
poaching gang.  For the black market price I consider an increase and a decrease from 
the base-case value of    $3,000 for a pair of ivory tusks in Table 4.2.  I note that the 
number of planned poaching expeditions does not change for either of these cases, and 
remains at     9.  Only the profit increases significantly when the price is raised to 
$4,000.  Changing the cost parameter also does not affect the key results of this 
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chapter.  The planned number of poaching expeditions remains at     9.  I also 
examine what happens when the catchability coefficient doubles from    2.56*10-3 
to 5.12*10
-3
.  The median harvest increases to 10,035 and the median population 
declines to 356,849 compared to their respective base-case values.  However there is 
no change in the planned poaching expeditions.  When the catchability coefficient 
decreases from    2.56*10-3 to 2.56*10-4 I note that median harvest declines 
dramatically to 550.  Again there is no change in the planned poaching expeditions, 
and it remains at     9.   
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Table 4.5: Sensitivity analysis of model parameters for the case of one poaching gang. 
 
Base case 
parameters 
a
    500    4,000    3,000    500    5.12*10-3    2.56*10-4 
Population (minimum) 375,790 371,920 372,448 373,296 373,638 348,187 390,205 
Population (median) 376,975 376,948 376,741 377,005 376,921 356,849 390,586 
Total Harvest (minimum) 1,637 2,024 2,021 2,305 1,910 3,413 270 
Total Harvest (median) 5,307 5,304 5,412 5,364 5,330 10,035 550 
Total Harvest (maximum) 8,028 8,107 8,075 8,105 8,513 15,770 889 
Total Poaching trips 
(minimum) 4 2 2 2 2 1 2 
Total Poaching trips (median) 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 
Total Poaching trips 
(maximum) 6 8 8 8 8 8 9 
Profit minimum (per gang) 8,982,000 1,478,000 12,091,000 9,108,200 8,895,000 16,716,000 924,480 
   9 9 9 9 9 9 9 
Elephant extinction No No No No No No No 
a
 Refer to Table 4.2 for the base-case values of the economic parameters of the model.   
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4.5   Conclusions and Caveats  
This chapter has developed a model of high-tech, stochastic poaching where the 
number of elephant killed by poachers is a random variable determined by the realized 
number of completed poaching expeditions.  Stochastic poaching induces a stochastic 
evolution in the elephant population.  The salient results of this chapter are as follows.  
First, the optimal number of planned poaching expeditions may be relatively 
insensitive to the black-market price for ivory and the elephant population, but quite 
sensitive to the probability of detection and interception by anti-poaching patrols.  
Second, increasing the number of poaching gangs not only lowers the mean of the 
elephant population but also increases the variance of its stationary distribution, when 
a stationary distribution exists.  Third, if poaching gangs were to become more high-
tech and thereby lower the probability of detection by anti-poaching patrols, the 
number of planned poaching expeditions increases and the frequency with which 
realized expeditions exceed the critical value,    (   )  ⁄ , may increase.  This 
may cause the elephant population to start a slow descent toward extinction.  Fourth, 
when the probability of interception is low (i.e.  (  )      ), the addition of a third, 
high-tech poaching gang results in a stochastic bifurcation where the elephant 
population permanently drops below a critical threshold.  This can cause the poaching 
gangs to lower the number of planned poaching expeditions to below the critical 
threshold of           , and thereby allow the elephant population to stabilize at a 
low level.   
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Under open access conditions there is incentive for additional poaching gangs 
to operate as long as positive profits are expected, or the elephant population is not 
extinct.  I examined this possibility for up to twenty poaching gangs.  The planned 
number of poaching expeditions declines to one trip per year when twenty gangs 
operate.  There are high levels of poaching in the beginning time periods of our 
simulations, and this causes the population to rapidly decline towards extinction.  With 
rapidly declining elephant populations the planned expeditions eventually begin to 
decline.  The expected profits also decline and this decreases the incentive for 
additional gangs to operate.      
The simulated estimates of poaching or illegal harvest levels are corroborated 
by anecdotal evidence and reports of elephant poaching in the Southern African range 
states.  I noted earlier in this chapter that Wasser et. al. (2007) estimated that  
approximately 23,000 savannah elephants were illegally harvested from the southern 
African range states in 2006.  The closest simulated result that I derived was an 
average of 23,932 elephants killed per year across the Southern African elephant range 
states.  This was the scenario of two poaching gangs that became more high-tech, 
thereby lowering the probability of detection to  (  )   0.05.  The planned number of 
expeditions increased to   
   19 from the base-case value of 9.  In this scenario I also 
noted that the elephant population begins a slow descent towards extinction.   
The model in this chapter has no spatial dimension; more realistic models 
should incorporate spatial differences between the range states in Southern Africa, 
including suitable habitat, the current size of elephant populations in those countries, 
the migration of elephant between countries, and most importantly, the country-
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specific investment to prevent poaching.  Based on the location of elephant and the 
expected number of anti-poaching patrols, a poaching gang would need to determine 
not only the number of planned expeditions but their location.  The resulting model 
might be viewed as a repeated game between poachers and anti-poaching patrols with 
sub-game strategies that would depend on the location of elephant herds and the 
expected deployment of anti-poaching patrols.  High-tech poaching will require a 
high-tech, game-theoretic strategic response.  In the next chapter of this dissertation I 
develop a model of strategic interaction between poachers and anti-poachers in terms 
of their location choices in space.    
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CHAPTER 5 
 
POACHING AND THE PROTECTION OF AN ENDANGERED SPECIES:  
A GAME-THEORETIC APPROACH 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
As noted in Chapter 4 the poaching of endangered species has increased significantly 
over the last decade.  Species such as elephants and rhinos have been subject to 
increasing levels of poaching, which pose a significant threat to their sustainability (Sas-
Rolfes, 2012; Wasser et al., 2007; Wasser et al., 2008).  Endangered species are often 
distributed over large areas of Africa and Asia.  Anti-poaching or protection units have 
limited resources at their disposal, which makes it unlikely that they can choose to 
simultaneously protect all areas inhabited by the endangered species.  Anti-poaching 
units would have to behave strategically by choosing where to devote patrolling activities 
so as to increase the chances of intercepting and destroying poaching units.  Poaching 
units might also behave strategically by choosing where to poach so as to increase the 
chances of avoiding anti-poaching units.  In this chapter we propose a novel theoretical 
framework to examine such strategic interaction and relate it to the ecological aspects of 
endangered species – including population growth over time and population dispersal 
over space.  This chapter asks the following questions:  (1) “What anti-poaching strategy 
can best combat the best strategy of a poaching unit in terms of location choices?” and (2) 
“How do these strategies affect the population sustainability of an endangered species?”   
The biological literature provides interesting insight into strategic interaction 
between opposing entities.  For instance, in host-parasite systems such interactions have 
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been modeled as zero-sum games, which provide a framework to study the evolutionary 
fitness of strategies for hosts and parasites (Adami, Schossau, & Hintze, 2012; Cohen & 
Newman, 1989; Kerr et al., 2002; Kirkup & Riley, 2004).  A parasite may favor one 
distribution of possible strategies so as to maximize the mean change in its net 
reproductive rate.  The host, in defending itself from the parasite, will favor a different 
distribution, one that minimizes the net reproductive rate of the parasite (Cohen & 
Newman, 1989).  The value of the host-parasitic interaction may be defined as the mean 
change in net reproductive rate when evolutionary fitness forces the parasite to maximize 
the mean change in its net reproductive rate, given that the host is evolving (choosing 
strategies) by minimizing the net reproductive rate that the parasite can achieve.   Cohen 
& Newman (1989) find that the best mean change in the parasite’s net reproductive rate 
results from the randomization of strategies from stable distributions for parasites and 
hosts.  In the context of this chapter we provide a framework to examine the strategic, 
antagonistic interaction between opposing units – poachers and anti-poachers.  
Economists usually model poaching as optimal harvesting decisions under open 
access, steady-state equilibrium i.e. species population growth is exactly offset by species 
population harvest in bio-economic models.  Such models predict how steady-state levels 
of endangered species populations respond to conservation policies and changes in 
economic parameters.
6
  Other studies note that ecological systems are often in a state of 
flux and therefore models should extend their scope beyond steady-state equilibrium  
                                                 
6
 A number of studies analyze how poaching is affected by various conservation policies – including trade 
bans (Bulte & van Kooten, 1999, Burton, 1999), fines for poaching (Bulte & van Kooten, 1999, Damania, 
Milner-Gulland, & Crookes, 2005, Damania et al., 2003, Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams, 1992, 
Skonhoft & Solstad, 1998), alternative livelihoods options when there are conflicting land use and species 
conservation priorities(Fischer, Muchapondwa, & Sterner, 2011, Johannesen & Skonhoft, 2005, Skonhoft, 
2007), price-control through supply restrictions(Brown & Layton, 2001, Kremer & Morcom, 2000, Mason, 
Bulte, & Horan, 2012), and the controversial shoot-poachers-on-sight policy (Messer, 2010).  
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(Barrett & Arcese, 1998; Skonhoft, 2007).  Moreover species populations are known to 
disperse over large areas by virtue of population movements or migration.  When 
studying ecological systems that have resources distributed heterogeneously in space 
(Sanchirico & Wilen, 1999a) note that a considerable amount of economic behavior of 
resource harvesters is unaccounted for when a model ignores such heterogeneity.  Bulte 
et al. (2004) and Skonhoft (2007) note that models linking ecology and economics should 
incorporate variability, complexity, scale, and uncertainty; thereby emphasizing the need 
for further research on the interaction between ecological variability and the economic 
behavior of individuals.  With ecosystems continually changing models should 
incorporate ecological variability of interconnected habitats and the opportunity costs of 
protecting them (Bulte et al., 2004).  For instance, in a spatial econometric study Frank & 
Maurseth (2006) find that elephant population changes in one country positively affect 
population changes in neighboring countries or habitats.   Frank & Maurseth (2006) 
hypothesize that poachers account for variations in anti-poaching enforcement in 
different habitats; thereby emphasizing that economic behavior is dependent on the 
spatial aspects of resource distribution.  Natural resource models allow for spatial 
heterogeneity of the resource and connectivity between meta-populations through 
population dispersal (Conrad & Smith, 2012; Sanchirico & Wilen, 1999a; Skonhoft, 
2007).
7
   
                                                 
7 (Sanchirico & Wilen, 1999a) show how the dispersal of meta-populations can be modeled in several 
ways – such as fully integrated systems, closed systems, sink-source systems, and spatially linear systems.  
In a fully integrated system biomass disperses directly from one patch to any other patch in the system.  In 
a closed system the maintenance of biomass density within each region is only determined by its own 
production and no dispersal occurs anywhere in the system.  In a sink-source system one or more patches 
provide unidirectional biomass movement to other patches.  In a spatially linear system one can have 
dispersal in a pairwise fashion between adjacent patches.  Animal population dispersal is often observed as 
being of the sink-source variety – for instance the African savannah elephant (Muchapondwa & Ngwaru, 
2010; Van Aarde et al., 2008), the wildebeest (Johannesen & Skonhoft, 2004), reindeer and moose 
(Skonhoft, 2007) usually migrate seasonally depending on food availability in different climatic regions.   
  
 109 
In this chapter we do not examine resource harvesting and protection decisions in 
terms of their optimal magnitudes or levels (since this has been dealt with extensively by 
previous studies as noted).  Instead we focus on the strategic interaction between 
poachers and anti-poachers in terms of choosing locations (i.e. patches or habitats) to 
poach and protect respectively in the presence of a spatially distributed resource.  
Successful poaching (unsuccessful protection) versus unsuccessful poaching (successful 
protection) will be the stochastic outcome of a repeated game.  Using insights from the 
biological literature on antagonistic interactions, we will consider how randomization 
might lead to higher evolutionary fitness, or higher payoffs, for both poaching units as 
well as anti-poaching units.  We will also examine the effects of different location choice 
strategies on species population dynamics and sustainability.  In section 5.2 we lay out 
the components of the game, the payoffs and potential strategies of the opponents, a 
solution for a Nash equilibrium, and simulations of the model.  In section 5.3 we provide 
a discussion of the model’s simulation results, some caveats, and a conclusion.   
 
5.2.1 A Model of Poaching and Protection 
Consider a “space” represented by a three-by-three grid as shown in Figure 5.1.  The 
protected species population is distributed spatially and temporally across the nine 
patches or cells as and when seasonal migration takes place.  In season one of the first 
year the population is distributed over seasonal patches 1, 2, & 3 in the row denoted 
season    1.  In season two migration of the meta-populations in the three seasonal 
patches takes place from row    1 to row    2, when the meta-populations flow to the 
subsequent three seasonal patches.  Migration routes follow a northward direction from 
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season one through season three, and then turn southward in season four, returning to the 
seasonal patches 1, 2, & 3 at the beginning of season one in the subsequent year.  
Migration coefficients determine the population distribution across the grid, over the four 
seasons, in each year.  Thereby the meta-populations are distributed in the seasonal 
patches 1, 2, & 3 in seasons one, two, three, and four in the rows denoted by season    
1,    2,    3, and    4 respectively.  The migration cycle continues year after year.   
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Figure 5.1: Space within which seasonal migration, poaching and anti-poaching 
patrolling take place.  
 
A poaching unit and an anti-poaching unit choose patches to operate in each 
season.  The poaching unit wants to choose a patch that has no anti-poaching unit in it in 
order to successfully harvest the patch population.  At the same time the anti-poaching 
unit wants to choose the same patch as the poaching unit in order to intercept it, and 
thereby successfully preserve the resident patch population.  If the poaching unit selects a 
different patch from the anti-poaching unit , the poaching unit kills some proportion of 
the resident patch’s animal population.  If both choose the same patch then the poaching 
unit is decommissioned for the rest of that year, and a new poaching unit forms in season 
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one of the following year.  In each season both units know the population distribution in 
the three seasonal patches.  We use the following notation for our model:  
 
         : seasonal patch index,  
         : number of seasons within a year, 
         : year index, 
      : species meta-population in time period  , in season  , in patch  .  
      : migration coefficient for meta-population flowing from patch   in season  , to 
patch   in season    ;           , ∑       
 
     , 
     : kill rate of the poaching unit, 
                : population lost to poaching in year  , in season  , in patch  ,  
               (             )  ∑       (             )   : species meta-population in 
year  , in season    , in patch  , 
      : initial population distribution in    , in    , in patch  ,  
In season one of each year the population is augmented by the offspring of 
population that survives poaching and natural mortality in the previous year.  The 
surviving meta-populations in season one of the next year,    , can be denoted as per 
the iterative map (5.1), with  (⋅) being a population growth function:  
 
         {      [        (⋅)        ]  ∑       [        (⋅)        ]   }  (5.1) 
 
Given the seasonal location of the species’ meta-populations, the poaching unit 
and the anti-poaching unit must make binary decisions        {   } and        {   } in 
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season      1, 2, 3, and 4, in patch   1, 2, and 3.  With only one patch chosen by the 
poaching unit and the anti-poaching unit we impose the restriction that ∑           and 
∑          .   
 
5.2.2 Payoffs and Strategies 
Location or patch choice strategies could potentially depend on the population 
distribution in the seasonal patches.  We assume the poaching unit is myopic and 
maximizes the expected payoff in each season given the chosen strategy of the anti-
poaching unit.  With myopic poaching in each season the anti-poaching unit maximizes 
its own expected payoff, or equivalently minimizes the expected loss to poaching for a 
given population distribution.  Similar to how hosts and parasites choose to randomize 
strategies for their own evolutionary fitness (as noted in section 5.1) we will now 
consider whether randomization of patch choice strategy by poaching and the anti-
poaching units lead to higher payoffs when the game is repeated.  The poaching unit 
might consider randomizing using the population in the seasonal patches to generate a 
discrete distribution for selecting a patch in which to poach.  The anti-poaching unit 
similarly generates a discrete distribution for selecting a patch to patrol.  For ease of 
notation we can ignore the season ( ) and time ( ) subscripts of the meta-populations in 
the seasonal patches and refer to       ,       , and        simply as   ,   , and   . 
As payoffs let us consider the following.  If, for instance, in a given season the 
poaching unit chooses seasonal patch   and the anti-poaching unit chooses another 
seasonal patch   (  ) then the poaching unit achieves a payoff of    , which is the 
population killed since the poaching unit would have successfully evaded the anti-
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poaching unit.  The anti-poaching unit therefore loses     of the population to poaching.  
If however both choose the same patch then the poaching unit is destroyed and there is no 
loss of that patch’s resident population to poaching.  Consequently the poaching unit is 
destroyed and there are no gains for the poaching unit.
8
  We assume that the cost of 
choosing a patch is zero for both the poaching unit and the anti-poaching unit.  We 
further assume that the gain to the anti-poaching unit when choosing the same patch as 
the poaching unit is only the amount of the resident species population that is not lost to 
poaching, i.e. zero.  We can thereby formulate the payoffs and losses, to the poaching 
unit and anti-poaching unit respectively, as a zero-sum game.  Since the kill rate of the 
poaching unit ( ) is a common term we can ignore it in the payoff matrix shown in 
Figure 5.2.  
 
  Anti-poaching unit  
  Patch   (  ) Patch   (  ) Patch   (  ) 
 Patch   (  )                   
Poaching unit  Patch   (  )                   
 Patch   (  )                   
Figure 5.2: Payoff matrix of the seasonal game.  
We denote the set of possible actions (patch choices of the poaching unit and the 
anti-poaching unit) as   {     }   We denote    {(        )   
 |(        )  
  ∑    
 
     } as the set of probability distributions of the poaching unit on  .  
Similarly we denote    {(        )   
 |(        )    ∑    
 
     } as the set 
                                                 
8 We ignore any monetary cost (such as poaching fines) to the poaching unit when decommissioned since 
this could be considered as a transfer from the poaching unit to the patrol with the same property of a zero-
sum payoff in the game.  
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of probability distributions of the anti-poaching unit on  .    (     ) is the poaching 
unit’s payoff associated with the action pair (     )     .  The poaching unit’s 
expected payoff for a pair of mixed strategies (   )        would equal 
 [  (   )]  ∑  (  ) (  )(     )      (     ).   Similarly the anti-poaching unit’s 
expected payoff for a pair of mixed strategies (   )        would equal 
 [  (   )]  ∑  (  ) (  )(     )      (     ).   
The payoff matrix in Figure 5.2 shows that there are no dominant strategies for 
either the poaching unit or the anti-poaching unit.  We use the property that any two-
player game must have at least one Nash equilibrium (Gibbons, 1992) to derive a solution 
to the game.  With no dominant strategies for either player the solution is that of a mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium.  We list the associated Nash equilibrium probabilities over the 
action spaces for the poaching unit and the anti-poaching unit.  The derivation of the 
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and a proof of its uniqueness are provided in Appendix 
5.1.  
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In a system with two seasonal patches we can similarly derive the associated 
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium probabilities over the action spaces of the poaching unit 
and the anti-poaching unit.  The derivation and the uniqueness proof are provided in 
Appendix 5.1.    
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In order to derive the intuition behind this result we turn to the two-player game 
of rock-paper-scissors.  In the two player zero-sum game of rock-paper-scissors 
Nouweland (2007) analytically proves that, with equal payoffs for each of the three 
actions, the unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium is to play each action with equal 
probability, i.e. one-third each.  If however one were to modify the game of rock-paper-
scissors with unequal payoffs then it can be shown that on average the players will each 
choose an action depending on the chances of that action defeating their opponent’s 
chosen action in such a way that expected payoffs for each action tend towards zero in 
equilibrium.
9
  Drawing from the zero-sum game of rock-paper-scissors with uneven 
payoffs we can infer an interpretation of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium 
((  
    
    
  ) (  
    
    
  )) in the economic game of poaching and protection.  The 
poaching unit’s probability of choosing a location depends on how often he expects the 
anti-poaching unit to choose the other location(s), given the seasonal population 
distribution.  The anti-poaching unit’s probability of choosing a location to patrol 
depends on how often it expects the poaching unit to choose that location, thereby 
minimizing the expected loss of population to poaching given the seasonal population 
distribution.  We note that if the meta-populations were to be evenly distributed in a 
season then the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium values would be exactly (( ⁄    ⁄
                                                 
9 For example if the wining payoffs to rock, paper, and scissors are 1, 3, and 5 (i.e. rock beating only 
scissors with a payoff of 1, paper beating only rock with a payoff of 3, and scissors beating only paper with 
a payoff of 5), then it can be shown that players would choose to play rock with 5/9 th probability, paper 
with 1/9th probability, and scissors with 3/9th probability. 
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   ⁄  ) ( ⁄    ⁄    ⁄  )) in the three seasonal patches system, and (( ⁄    ⁄
 ) ( ⁄    ⁄  )) in the two seasonal patches system.      
 
 
5.2.3 Simulations of the Game 
Having derived a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in our game of poaching and 
protection we proceed to study the effect of this strategy on the population dynamics of 
an endangered species.  The model is applied to the case of the migratory savannah 
elephant (Loxodonta africana).  The logistic growth function is often used to model 
elephant population dynamics (Bulte & van Kooten, 1999; Milner-Gulland & Leader-
Williams, 1992).  Following Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams (1992) we adopt a 
skewed-logistic specification for the population growth function  ( )    
  (  (  ⁄ ) ).    is the population,   is the intrinsic net growth rate of population,   is 
the habitat carrying capacity, and   is a skew parameter.  The surviving adult population 
at the end of season four of year   is augmented by the birth of juveniles in season one of 
the next year     as per the iterative map previously defined in (5.1):  
 
         {      [      (   (  (        ⁄ )
 
))        ]
 ∑       [      (   (  (        ⁄ )
 
))        ]
   
} 
 
 
Adult female elephants give birth to approximately one offspring every three 
years, which implies a population pregnancy rate of approximately 0.33 per year 
(Armbruster & Lande, 1993).  The average natural mortality rate of elephants has been 
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estimated at 0.27, which implies a net intrinsic growth rate of    0.06 (Armbruster & 
Lande, 1993).  A skew parameter greater than one (   1) is used to model population 
dynamics of large mammals (Cromsigt et al., 2002); Bulte & van Kooten (1999) and 
Milner-Gulland & Leader-Williams (1992) set    7.  We normalize the carrying 
capacity of the seasonal “space” to one (i.e. ∑      1), and assume it to be equally 
divided between the seasonal patches.   
Using the data of Bulte & van Kooten (1999) on illegal off-take of elephants in 
African range states we calculate the off-take rates as varying between 0.03% and 3.8% 
of the resident elephant population in the mid-1990s.  Noting the reports of organized 
criminal syndicates involved in elephant and rhino poaching in African range states 
(Mullen & Zhang, 2012; Sas-Rolfes, 2012; Shukman, 2013; Wassener, 2013; Wasser et 
al., 2008) it is likely that the scale and intensity of poaching has increased since the 
1990s.  Blanc (2007) estimates the savannah elephant population in Southern Africa as 
approximately 300,000 individuals.  Based on data from seizures of illegal ivory 
shipments amounting to roughly 24 tons in the year 2006.  Wasser et. al. (2007) use DNA 
analysis to estimate that  approximately 23,000 savannah elephants were illegally 
harvested from the southern African range states.  This evidence suggests an illegal off-
take rate of approximately 7% to 8% in the year 2006.  For the base-case set of 
parameters in the model we assume a poaching off-take/kill rate of    0.07.  Table 5.1 
lists the base-case values of the model’s parameters.  
 
 
 
  
 118 
 
Table 5.1: Model base-case parameter values  
Parameter  Value Source 
Intrinsic growth rate    0.06 (Armbruster & Lande, 1993) 
Logistic growth skew 
parameter  
   7 (Bulte & van Kooten, 1999; Milner-
Gulland & Leader-Williams, 1992) 
Poaching/off-take rate     0.07 Based on data from Wasser et. 
al.(2007) 
Initial meta-
populations  
        0.15  
(   1,2,3) 
 
Carrying capacity ∑       1  
Number of time 
periods 
   100  
 
 
We assume an evenly distributed initial elephant population of            , 
           , and            .  Table 5.2 lists the migration coefficients for the spatial-
temporal dispersal of the meta-populations in our space (Figure 5.1).  For simplicity these 
migration or dispersal coefficients are held constant over time.   
 
Table 5.2: Seasonal migration coefficients 
   :                                  
                                  
                                  
   :                                  
                                  
                                  
   :                                  
                                  
                                  
   :                                  
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As noted previously in the setup of the game the poaching unit wants to choose a 
patch with no anti-poaching unit, and the anti-poaching unit wants to choose the same 
patch.  If different patches are selected the poaching unit kills some proportion ( ) of the 
resident population.  If both choose the same patch then the poaching unit is 
“decommissioned” for the rest of that year, but a new poaching unit forms in season one 
of the next year.  Given initial conditions, the model parameters in Table 5.1, and the set 
of migration coefficients in Table 5.2, the random process of poaching and protection 
will cause the elephant population to evolve stochastically over   years.  We simulate 
approach paths for a period of    100 years (i.e. 400 seasons) to garner insight of the 
long-term effects of location strategies on species population dynamics.  Qualitatively 
different approach paths would arise depending on the type of strategy chosen by the 
poaching unit and anti-poaching unit.  
We first study the effect on elephant population dynamics when the poaching unit 
and the anti-poaching unit randomize their seasonal location choices based on their 
respective mixed strategy Nash equilibrium probabilities.   
 
Mixed strategy Nash equilibrium randomness: 
((        ) (        ))  ((  
    
    
  ) (  
    
    
  )) 
 
Next we study the effect on elephant population dynamics when the poaching unit 
and the anti-poaching unit randomize their location choices uniformly with equal 
probability of choosing any of the seasonal locations. 
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Mixed strategy uniform randomness:  
((        ) (        ))  ((  ⁄    ⁄    ⁄ ) (  ⁄    ⁄    ⁄ )) 
 
Given the previous two sets of strategies we consider two possible combinations 
of them.  This can be used to determine if there is incentive for either the anti-poaching 
unit or the poaching unit to deviate from the Nash equilibrium.  In the first combination 
the anti-poaching unit chooses the mixed Nash equilibrium strategy and the poaching unit 
deviates by choosing the uniform mixed strategy.  In the second combination we look at 
the opposite case where the anti-poaching unit deviates by choosing the uniform mixed 
strategy and the poaching unit plays the Nash mixed strategy.       
 
Mixed strategy: Uniform and Nash equilibrium randomness 
((        ) (        ))  ((  ⁄    ⁄    ⁄ ) (  
    
    
  )) 
or 
((        ) (        ))  ((  
    
    
  ) (  ⁄    ⁄    ⁄ )) 
 
Lastly we consider the effect on population dynamics when the strategy of the 
anti-poaching unit is to patrol the patch with the highest species meta-population.  The 
strategy of the poaching unit is to select in the patch with the next highest meta-
population.  
 
Non-random strategy:  
                          (   ) 
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                          (   ) 
 
Population dynamics and the average payoffs to the anti-poaching unit and 
poaching unit under the different strategies as listed are compared with that of the mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium.  Figure 5.3 charts the results of a single simulation for each of 
the strategy sets over the one hundred year time horizon for the set of base-case model 
parameters.  The simulations are repeated one thousand times and the average population 
and poaching levels are reported on the right-hand side panel of Figure 5.3.  The mixed 
Nash strategy is shown in green; the uniform random strategy is shown in blue; the 
combination of the anti-poaching unit playing the Nash mixed strategy and the poaching 
unit playing the uniform random mixed strategy is shown in purple; the combination of 
the poaching unit playing the Nash mixed strategy and the anti-poaching unit playing the 
uniform random mixed strategy is shown in red; and finally the non-random strategy is 
shown in black.  Each of the random strategies appear to have the effect of leading to 
higher elephant population over time when compared with the non-random strategy.  For 
each of the strategy sets we list the average values of population and poaching from 
season two hundred to season four hundred, or the period of time when a stable 
distribution of population is attained.  This reduces the effect of the initial conditions on 
the average values.   
Let us study the average values of population and poaching of Figure 5.3 a little 
more closely.  The average values of population and poaching are 0.82516 and 0.00745 
in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.  This is what the anti-poaching unit and the 
poaching unit can expect on average.  Now we ascertain if there is incentive for either 
  
 122 
party to deviate from playing the Nash mixed strategy.  If the poaching unit deviates by 
playing the uniform strategy while the anti-poaching unit continues playing the Nash 
strategy we note that the average poaching level declines to 0.00739 and the average 
population increases to 0.82657 which is statistically greater than the Nash equilibrium 
value at the ten percent error level.  There is therefore no incentive for the poaching unit 
to deviate from playing the Nash strategy.  If the anti-poaching unit deviates from playing 
the Nash strategy by playing the uniform random strategy, while the poaching unit 
continues to play the Nash strategy the anti-poaching unit is better off since the average 
population increases to 0.83374 and the average poaching level declines to 0.00724.  The 
average population level is also statistically greater than the Nash equilibrium value at the 
one percent error level.  Since the poaching unit is worse off it will consider playing the 
uniform random strategy as well and increase its average payoff- poaching value- to 
0.00761.  The average population value declines to 0.81551, which is statistically lower 
than the Nash equilibrium value at the one percent error level.  This creates a disincentive 
for both the anti-poaching unit and the poaching unit to deviate from playing the mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium.   
We carry out further numerical analyses by varying the poaching unit’s kill rate, 
 , between 3% and 12% to account for a wide range of poaching efficiency rates.  The 
simulation results are plotted in Figures 5.4 through 5.8 for    3%, 5%, 8%, 10%, and 
12%.  We note that for   between 3% and 8% the broad results are similar to the base-
case when    7%.  The differences in average population levels are statistically 
different from the Nash equilibrium average values.  Apart from    3% we note that the 
random strategies achieve higher average payoffs for both the anti-poaching unit and the 
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poaching unit . Similar to the results in Figure 5.3 the simulated average values of 
population and poaching in Figure 5.4, Figure 5.5, and Figure 5.7 suggest that the Nash 
mixed strategy is a unique equilibrium on average.  When the poaching off-take/ kill rate 
is increased to    10% we begin to notice that the differences in average poaching 
become statistically significant when compared with the average Nash equilibrium 
values.  The population distributions are no longer stable and the variance increases 
dramatically.  One thing that we do note is that the uniform random strategy does worse 
than the Nash for both units.  In Figure 5.8 when    12% we note that the elephant 
meta-populations begin a slow decline towards extinction for each of the random location 
choice strategies.  The non-random location choice strategies always result in very quick 
declines towards the meta-populations’ extinction.   
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Uniform 
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(-0.4540) 
Random: Nash 0.82516 0.00745 
Anti-poaching 
unit (Nash); 
Poaching unit 
(Uniform) 
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(0.1409) 
Anti-poaching 
unit 
(Uniform); 
Poaching unit 
(Nash) 
0.83374 
(-8.4142)*** 
0.00724 
(0.5557) 
Non Random 
 
0.02395 
(649.97)*** 
0.00059 
(26.89)*** 
 
Figure 5.3: Population and poaching dynamics with initial population set at 0.45, and poaching off-take set at        
t-statistics of difference of means between Nash equilibrium value and other strategy’s equilibrium value in (parentheses).  *** statistically significant mean 
difference at 1% error level;  ** statistically significant mean difference at 5% error level;  * statistically significant mean difference at 10% error level. 
 
 
 
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1
2
8
5
5
8
2
1
0
9
1
3
6
1
6
3
1
9
0
2
1
7
2
4
4
2
7
1
2
9
8
3
2
5
3
5
2
3
7
9
P
o
p
u
la
ti
o
n
 
Season 
Population Dynamics 
Random: Uniform
Non Random
Random: Nash
Patrol (Nash); Gang
(Uniform)
Patrol (Uniform); Gang
(Nash)
  
 125 
 
 
Average Population 
∑ (
∑   
   
     
       ) 
    
   
    
 
Average Poaching 
∑ (
∑   
   
     
       ) 
    
   
    
 
Random: 
Uniform 
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(-0.4554) 
Random: 
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Non Random 
 
0.80046 
(123.8)*** 
0.00856 
(-35.94)*** 
 
Figure 5.4: Population and poaching dynamics with initial population set at 0.45, and poaching off-take set at        
t-statistics of difference of means between Nash equilibrium value and other strategy’s equilibrium value in (parentheses).  *** statistically significant mean 
difference at 1% error level;  ** statistically significant mean difference at 5% error level;  * statistically significant mean difference at 10% error level. 
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Random: 
Uniform 
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(-0.5483) 
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(0.3412) 
Anti-poaching 
unit 
(Uniform); 
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(-4.2492)*** 
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0.17331 
(298.3)*** 
0.00309 
(13.22)*** 
 
Figure 5.5: Population and poaching dynamics with initial population set at 0.45, and poaching off-take set at        
t-statistics of difference of means between Nash equilibrium value and other strategy’s equilibrium value in (parentheses).  *** statistically significant mean 
difference at 1% error level;  ** statistically significant mean difference at 5% error level;  * statistically significant mean difference at 10% error level. 
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Random: 
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Non Random 
 
0.0000 
(1030.9)*** 
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Figure 5.6: Population and poaching dynamics with initial population set at 0.45, and poaching off-take set at        
t-statistics of difference of means between Nash equilibrium value and other strategy’s equilibrium value in (parentheses).  *** statistically significant mean 
difference at 1% error level;  ** statistically significant mean difference at 5% error level;  * statistically significant mean difference at 10% error level. 
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Figure 5.7: Population and poaching dynamics with initial population set at 0.45, and poaching off-take set at        
t-statistics of difference of means between Nash equilibrium value and other strategy’s equilibrium value in (parentheses).  *** statistically significant mean 
difference at 1% error level;  ** statistically significant mean difference at 5% error level;  * statistically significant mean difference at 10% error level. 
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Figure 5.8: Population and poaching dynamics with initial population set at 0.45, and poaching off-take set at        
t-statistics of difference of means between Nash equilibrium value and other strategy’s equilibrium value in (parentheses).  *** statistically significant mean 
difference at 1% error level;  ** statistically significant mean difference at 5% error level;  * statistically significant mean difference at 10% error level. 
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5.3   Discussion and Conclusion  
The model simulation exercises provide some key results in this chapter.  We observe 
that when both the anti-poaching unit and the poaching unit play their mixed strategy 
Nash equilibrium strategies they achieve higher payoffs on average as compared with 
the uniform random strategy.  This holds true for a wide range in values for the 
poaching efficiency parameter,  .  The numerical analysis also reveals that on average 
there is no incentive for either the anti-poaching unit or the poaching unit to deviate 
from the Nash equilibrium.  This occurs in the range 3%     8%, i.e. when we 
observe stable distributions of population over a long time horizon.  This corroborates 
the analytical proof of the uniqueness of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.  The 
base-case value of    7% is estimated from secondary data in the literature.  We 
have considered what would occur if   were to increase i.e. poaching units become 
more effective.  The population distributions are no longer stable, the variances in the 
distributions increase significantly, and the meta-populations start to descend towards 
extinction over time.   
The different random strategies achieve higher payoffs for both the units 
compared to the non-random strategy.  This result mirrors findings from other studies 
on evolutionary fitness of strategies in zero-sum antagonistic games between strategic 
opponents  (Adami et al., 2012; Cohen & Newman, 1989; Kerr et al., 2002; Kirkup & 
Riley, 2004).  The numerical results also suggest that non-random strategies lead to 
extinction of meta-populations when   increases.  The incentive for both the anti-
poaching unit and the poaching unit to deviate from playing the Nash strategy is 
  131 
stronger once the poaching off-take rate increases beyond eight percent.  The 
differences in average payoffs between the Nash strategies and other random strategies 
become statistically significant.  At the same time however we observe that the 
population stocks decline rapidly, and that population distributions are no longer 
stable.   
We noted earlier that the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium probabilities would 
be identical to those of the uniform random strategy if the meta-populations were 
evenly distributed across seasonal patches in the conceptual space.  The probabilistic 
nature of choosing patches by both the anti-poaching unit and the poaching unit, in 
conjunction with the set of migration coefficients, leads to uneven seasonal population 
distributions in our numerical analyses.  We have confirmed that the Nash strategy is 
superior to the uniform random strategy for both the anti-poaching unit and the 
poaching unit.  The superiority of the Nash strategy stems from the nature of the game 
of poaching and protection, in that the players behave strategically with each other.  
Deviations from the Nash for either player would merit careful consideration.  
This chapter has considered the theoretical implications of optimal strategies 
on the population dynamics of an endangered species.  The model is generally 
applicable to other species, and it can also be scaled up for more realistic analysis.  
Different growth functions and biological parameters can be used in the model to 
better suit the modeling of different species’ population dynamics.  The set of 
migration coefficients in Table 5.2 can be modified to reflect different proportions of 
the meta-populations that migrate from one patch to another.  For simplicity we 
assumed a costless choice of patch to poach and patrol in the conceptual space.  The 
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model can be modified to account for heterogeneity in patrolling and poaching costs in 
the different seasonal patches.  The model can be applied to an empirical setting if 
data were to be made available on poaching and patrolling.  In scaling up this model 
one could think about adding more seasonal patches in the space, adding more anti-
poaching units, and adding more poaching units to reflect a more realistic setting. 
As we noted earlier Bulte et al., (2004) state that models which link ecological 
theory and natural resource economics should expand their scope beyond the notion of 
steady state equilibrium by incorporating variability, complexity, scale, and 
uncertainty into economic models.  This chapter has considered purely the strategic 
aspects of poaching and protection when smart opponents face each other.  We 
introduced uncertainty into our model through the strategic location choices of a 
poaching unit and an anti-poaching unit.  Spatial-temporal strategic decisions by the 
poaching unit and the anti-poaching unit caused the number of elephants killed to 
become a stochastic process.  The model provides insight into the effects of different 
strategies on the long-term population dynamics of an endangered species, and thereby 
links the spatial-temporal dynamics of species migration with the economic game of 
poaching and protection.   
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APPENDIX 5.1 
 
Derivation of the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, and a proof of its uniqueness:  
 
Nouweland (2007) lists three conditions for the existence of a mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games.  We adapt the definition for the game in 
this chapter.  
Condition 1:  A pair of mixed strategies (   ) is a mixed Nash equilibrium if 
and only if the strategy of one player (poaching unit ) is a best response to the strategy 
of the other player (anti-poaching unit ) and vice-versa.    
Condition 2:  If (   ) ((   )) is a strategy profile and every action      
(    ) that the poaching unit (anti-poaching unit) plays with positive probability 
 (  )    ( (  )   ) is at least as good a response to   ( ) as every other action, 
then   ( ) is a best response to   ( ).  For the poaching unit (anti-poaching unit) this 
would mean  [  (    )]   [  (  
   )]  ( [  (    )]   [  (  
   )]) for all 
  
    (  
   ).  
Condition 3:  If      (    ) is a best response to      (    ) and 
the poaching unit (anti-poaching unit) plays action      (    ) with a positive 
probability, i.e. (  )    ( (  )   ), then    (  ) is at least as good a response to   
( ) as every other action.  For the poaching unit (anti-poaching unit) this would mean 
 [  (    )]   [  (  
   )]  ( [  (    )]   [  (  
   )]) for all   
    (  
   ).  
Using Condition 1 we can state that a pair of mixed strategies (   ) is a mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium if, for the poaching unit (anti-poaching unit) and every 
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alternative mixed strategy       (     ) of the poaching unit (anti-poaching unit) 
, it holds that  [  ( 
   )]   [  (   )] ( [  ( 
   )]   [  (   )]).  This entails 
that at a Nash equilibrium a player in the game will be indifferent between the action 
choices when the expected payoffs from these actions are equal to each other i.e. 
 [  (   )]   [  (   )] and  [  (   )]   [  (   )] where             and 
   . Given the payoff matrix in Figur we can define the associated expected payoffs 
to the poaching unit and the anti-poaching unit for the individual location choices or 
actions.  When there are two seasonal patches i.e.    , we have the expected 
payoffs for the poaching unit of choosing patches 1 and 2.   
 [  (   )]             (1) 
 [  (   )]             (2) 
  
Similarly we define the expected payoffs for the anti-poaching unit of choosing 
patches 1 and 2.  
 [  (   )]             (3) 
 [  (   )]             (4) 
 
Setting (1) = (2) and (3) = (4) we solve for the Nash equilibrium values of the 
system with two seasonal patches.  
  
  
  
     
 ,   
  
  
     
 ,    
  
  
     
 , and    
  
  
     
 .  
When there are three seasonal patches i.e.    , we have the expected payoffs 
for the poaching unit of choosing patches 1, 2, and 3.  
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 [  (   )]                   (5) 
 [  (   )]                   (6) 
 [  (   )]                   (7) 
 
Similarly we define the anti-poaching unit’s expected payoffs for its actions of 
choosing seasonal locations        .  
 [  (   )]                        (8) 
 [  (   )]                        (9) 
 [  (   )]               (10) 
 
Setting (5) = (6) = (7), and (8) = (9) = (10), and using that            
and            we solve for the Nash equilibrium values of the system with 
three seasonal patches.  
  
  
    
              
 ,   
  
    
              
 ,   
  
    
              
 ,  
   
  
              
              
 ,   
  
              
              
 ,   
  
              
              
 .   
 
First we prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the system with two 
seasonal patches.  We use the approach followed by (Nouweland, 2007) who uses 
Condition 2 and Condition 3 to show that a mixed strategy, which is not the Nash 
equilibrium, cannot be a best response to any strategy that is a best response to it.  We 
derive the following useful identities, which equal zero at the Nash equilibrium values.  
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Any deviations from the Nash equilibrium values would mean that the identities 
would no longer equal zero.  
 
(1) – (2):  [  (   )]   [  (   )]               
(3) – (4):  [  (   )]   [  (   )]               
 
Consider the first case of the poaching unit deviating from the Nash 
equilibrium:    
  
     
 ,    
  
     
 .  We will accordingly have (3) – (4)   0, and by 
Condition 2 we know that     .  But if      then we will have (1) – (2)   0, and 
by Condition 3 we know that     , which contradicts    
  
     
 for   ,     .  In 
the second case of the poaching unit deviating from the Nash equilibrium we consider 
   
  
     
 ,    
  
     
 .  We will accordingly have (3) – (4)   0, and by Condition 2 
we know that     .  But if      then we will have (1) – (2)   0, and by Condition 
3 we know that     , which contradicts    
  
     
 for   ,     .  The other two 
cases of the poaching unit deviating from the Nash equilibrium i.e.    
  
     
 & 
   
  
     
 , and    
  
     
 &    
  
     
 are mathematically not feasible since 
        by definition, and the latter two cases violate this condition.   
Let us now consider the first case of the anti-poaching unit deviating from the 
Nash equilibrium:    
  
     
 ,    
  
     
 .  We will accordingly have (1) – (2)   0, 
and by Condition 2 we know that     .  But if      then we will have (3) – (4)   
0, and by Condition 3 we know that     , which contradicts    
  
     
 for   , 
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    .  In the second case of the anti-poaching unit deviating from the Nash 
equilibrium we consider    
  
     
 ,    
  
     
 .  We will accordingly have (1) – (2) 
  0, and by Condition 2 we know that     .  But if      then we will have (3) – 
(4)   0, and by Condition 3 we know that     , which contradicts    
  
     
 for 
  ,     .  The other two cases of the anti-poaching unit deviating from the Nash 
equilibrium i.e.    
  
     
 &    
  
     
 , and    
  
     
 &    
  
     
 are 
mathematically not feasible since         by definition, and the latter two cases 
violate this condition.  This proves that a mixed strategy other than the Nash 
equilibrium is not a best response to any mixed strategy that is a best response to it.  
Using Condition 1 we have shown that there is no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in 
which the anti-poaching unit and poaching unit plays a strategy that is different from 
((  
    
  ) (  
    
 )) in a system with two seasonal patches.       
 Now we prove the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for a system with three 
seasonal patches.  Again we make use of the following identities that equal zero at the 
Nash equilibrium values.  
 
(5) – (6):  [  (   )]   [  (   )]                     
(5) – (7):  [  (   )]   [  (   )]                        
(8) – (9):  [  (   )]   [  (   )]               
(8) – (10):  [  (   )]   [  (   )]               
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Consider the first case of the poaching unit deviating from the Nash 
equilibrium:    
    
              
 ,    
    
              
 , &    
    
              
 .  The 
sign of (8) – (9) is ambiguous, while the sign of (8) – (10) is unambiguously greater 
than zero.  Suppose (8) – (9)    and (8) – (10)   .  Then by Condition 2 we know 
that      and     .  This would imply that (5)   , (6)   , & (7)  .  This in 
turn would imply that (5) – (6)    and (5) – (7)   .  Using Condition 3 we know 
that     , which contradicts    
    
              
.  Now suppose (8) – (9)    and 
(8) – (10)   .  By Condition 2 we know that      and     .  This implies that 
(5)   , (6)   , & (7)   .  This would imply that (5) – (6)   , and using Condition 
3 we would have     , which contradicts    
    
              
 .  
The proof by contradiction in the case of    
    
              
,    
    
              
 , &    
    
              
 holds by symmetry.  The case of    
    
              
 ,    
    
              
 , &    
    
              
 is straightforward since 
the signs of (8) – (9) and (8) – (10) would be unambiguously greater than zero.   
Consider next the case of   
    
              
,    
    
              
 , & 
   
    
              
 . The sign of (8) – (9) is unambiguously less than zero, but the 
sign of (8) – (10) is ambiguous.  Suppose (8) – (9)    and (8) – (10)   .  Then by 
Condition 2 we know that      and     .  This would imply that (5)   , (6)  
 , & (7)   .  This in turn would imply that (5) – (6)   , and by Condition 3     , 
which contradicts     
    
              
 .  Now suppose (8) – (9)    and (8) – (10) 
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  .  By Condition 2 this implies      and        , and thereby (5)        
        .  We also derive (6)         , and (7)         .
10
  Thereby we 
derive (5) – (6)   ,11 and we can infer from Condition 3 that     , which 
contradicts    
    
              
 .       
The proof by contradiction in the case of    
    
              
,    
    
              
 , &    
    
              
 holds by symmetry.  The case of    
    
              
,    
    
              
 , &    
    
              
 is straightforward since 
the signs of (8) – (9) and (8) – (10) would be unambiguously less than zero.  We have 
shown that (        )  (  
    
    
  ) is not a best response to (  
    
    
  ).  Next we 
prove that any deviation from (  
    
    
  ) is not optimal for the anti-poaching unit.   
Let us begin with the case of    
              
              
 ,    
              
              
 , 
   
              
              
.  The sign of (5) – (7) is unambiguously less than zero while the 
sign of (5) – (6) is ambiguous.12  Suppose (5) – (6)    and (5) – (7)   .  Then by 
Condition 2 we know that      and     .  This would imply that (8)    , (9) 
   , and (10)   .  This is turn implies that (8) – (10)    and (9) – (10)   .  
Using Condition 3 we can infer that      and     , which contradicts    
              
              
 and    
              
              
 .  Now suppose (5) – (6)    and (5) – (7)  
                                                 
10 Note that since   
  
              
              
   is only possible when               , we will have 
      
              
              
    (
                   
              
)     
       
              
  .  
11 (5) – (6)     
       
              
 
  (              )        
              
 
  (         )        
              
   (see 
footnote 10).   
12 Note that the sign and magnitude of    does not matter since it drops out of identities (5) – (6) and 
(5) – (7).    
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 .  Then by Condition 2 we know that      or that        .  This would imply 
that (8)                 , (9)            , and (10)        .  Therefore 
(8) – (9)   , and (8) – (10)   .  Using Condition 3 we can infer that     , which 
contradicts    
              
              
.  In the case of    
              
              
 ,    
              
              
 and    
              
              
 , we note that (5) – (7)    always and that 
since    enters as a positive term in (5) – (6) we have the same case of ambiguity in 
the sign of (5) – (6).       
Next we consider the case of    
              
              
 ,    
              
              
 and 
   
              
              
.  The sign of (5) – (6) is unambiguously greater than zero while 
the sign of (5) – (7) is ambiguous.  Suppose (5) – (6)    and (5) – (7)   .  Then by 
Condition 2 we know that      and      or that     .  This in turn implies that 
(8)   , (9)     , and (10)     .  Therefore we would have (8) – (9)      , 
and (10) – (9)      .  Using Condition 3 we can infer that     ,      , and 
    .  Now suppose (5) – (6)    and (5) – (7)   .  Then by Condition 2 we know 
that      and      or that     .  This in turn implies that (8)    , (9)     , 
and (10)   .  Therefore we would have (8) – (10)    and (10) – (9)   .  Using 
Condition 3 we can infer that     .   
Finally we consider the case of    
              
              
 ,    
              
              
 and 
   
              
              
.  The signs of both (5) – (6) and (5) – (7) are unambiguously 
greater than zero.  By Condition 2 we know that      and      or that     .  
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This implies (8)    and (10)        .  We now have (8) – (10)    and by 
Condition 3 we know that     .    
We have shown that a mixed strategy other than the Nash equilibrium is not a 
best response to any mixed strategy that is a best response to it.  Using Condition 1 we 
have shown that there is no mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which the anti-
poaching unit and poaching unit plays a strategy that is different from 
((  
    
    
  ) (  
    
    
  )) for the system with three seasonal patches. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
SUMMARY 
 
 
This dissertation has attempted to provide the reader with insights into the economics 
of endangered species harvesting and protection.  In the first essay (Chapter 2) the 
integrated economic and ecological model facilitated a numerical estimation of 
changes in poaching effort and protected population levels over time.  The Schaefer 
harvest function and the modified logistic growth function allow for both oscillatory 
convergence to steady state and period-doubling bifurcation.  The model reveals that 
the protected population dynamics goes through bifurcation for changes in both 
economic and biological parameters, and in some cases gives way to “deterministic” 
chaos.  We find that the economic or policy parameters – wage rates in and around the 
PA, fines for poaching, and black market prices – have qualitatively different effects 
on the protected species’ population dynamics.  The effectiveness of anti-poaching 
enforcement has different qualitative effects on population dynamics depending on the 
biological parameters.  The model reveals interesting and sometimes counterintuitive 
results for the economic and biological parameters, driven largely due to changing 
marginal products of harvest.   
 
In Chapter 3 we examined the relationship between civil unrest and rhino poaching.  
We found the relationship to be positive and statistically significant.  The analysis 
factored in the relationship between poaching and several additional variables that are 
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probably associated with it – including black market rhino horn prices, potential size 
of black markets, and anti-poaching efforts.  These variables are seen to have their 
predicted associations with poaching in the regression models.  They also help to 
isolate and identify the relationship between poaching civil unrest.  We find 
reasonably good fits between the rhino population data, poaching data, and the 
model’s estimates of the same.   
 
In Chapter 4 we examined an economic model of organized crime in elephant 
poaching in the Southern African range states.  We have seen that under plausible 
economic and biological parameters, the number of planned poaching expeditions is 
insensitive to the black-market price of ivory, but quite sensitive to the probability that 
a poaching expedition will be intercepted.  We ascertained a critical value for the 
number of poaching expeditions as approximately twenty-three per year, above which 
the elephant population may exhibit a slow decline to extinction.  The presence of 
multiple poaching organizations leads to a decline in elephant population and 
increased variance in the distribution.  The mathematical phenomenon of stochastic 
bifurcations occurs for the case of two or more poaching gangs operate with higher 
technology (as represented by lower probabilities of interception by anti-poaching 
patrols).   
 
In Chapter 5 we examined the effects of different location choice strategies on 
elephant population dynamics over time.  It is seen that random location choice 
strategies that account for spatial population distribution are superior to non-random 
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location choice strategies for both poachers and anti-poachers.  We derived a mixed 
strategy Nash equilibrium in location choice strategies, and also provided an analytical 
proof of optimality and uniqueness of this strategy.   
 
 
 
 
